Macalester College

DigitalCommons@Macalester College
Political Science Honors Projects

Political Science Department

4-29-2015

Unequal democracy: The political position of
Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Valentino Grbavac
Macalester College, valentino.grbavac@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/poli_honors
Part of the Political Science Commons
Recommended Citation
Grbavac, Valentino, "Unequal democracy: The political position of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina" (2015). Political Science Honors
Projects. Paper 51.
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/poli_honors/51

This Honors Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science Department at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more
information, please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.

POLITICAL SCIENCE HONORS PROJECT

Unequal democracy:
The political position of Croats in Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Valentino Grbavac
4/29/2015
Political Science Department
Advisor: Professor Andrew Latham

Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been marginalized during the last 15 years.
Bosniaks have elected a Croat member of the Presidency and formed a federal
government twice without legitimate Croat support, completely ignoring Croat electoral
will. Bosnia and Herzegovina is at a crossroads today, choosing between the potential for
a prosperous future in the EU and the status quo. Reforms of government structures are
necessary in order to solve the Croat issue and allow Bosnia and Herzegovina to ascend
to the EU. In this paper I map out the history of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina since
the 1990s and point out the difficulties they face today. I have come to the conclusion that
the three entity solution would be the best possible way to provide Croats with equal
rights. I hope this unique research will spark interest in the Croat issue and the importance
of its resolution for the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This page intentionally left blank.

1

Contents
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. 3
Acronyms ............................................................................................................................ 4
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 5
Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 9
A historical overview of modern Bosnia and Herzegovina up to the Dayton Peace
Agreement ......................................................................................................................... 11
The golden age for Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina .................................................... 25
The marginalization of Croats and the Croatian Home Rule............................................ 31
An analysis of the amendments to the Federal Constitution............................................. 40
The phenomenon of Željko Komšić ................................................................................. 48
Why the election of “Komšić Mark 2” failed ................................................................... 55
The unconstitutional usurpation of Croat political positions in the Federation ................ 58
Taxes, census, demonstrations and the current state......................................................... 64
Possible solutions:............................................................................................................. 69
A unitary state ............................................................................................................... 69
Regionalization.............................................................................................................. 71
Cantons .......................................................................................................................... 73
Return to the original Washington Agreement ............................................................. 74
The status quo and possible dissolution ........................................................................ 76
Three republics .............................................................................................................. 78
Three entities ................................................................................................................. 81
Conclusion: A long road ahead ......................................................................................... 84
Appendix ........................................................................................................................... 87
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 89

2

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my loving mother Milva, my caring father Miroslav and my little
brother Leon Mihael, along with my entire extended family, for supporting me over the
years and for encouraging me to reach higher and do my best. I am happy I was born into
such a family, and I will always love all of you.
I would also like to thank my cousin Marica Vasilj in particular for all the moral advice
and financial assistance during my studies at Macalester. I would not be where I am today
if it was not for you.
Dear Professor Latham: thank you for your wise guidance during this project and for four
years of Political Science classes filled with good memories.
In addition, I would like to thank Professor Weber and Professor Weisensel for accepting
my invitation and acting as examiners for my defense, as well as for writing many letters
of recommendation for graduate school. I really appreciate your time, and I will miss you
dearly once I graduate.
I am thankful to Mr. Ivan Vukoja and the whole IDPI team for all their assistance with
my research. I hope that this project will be just the beginning of a series of
collaborations.
I would like to express my gratitude to Mr. Vladimir Šoljić for allowing me to interview
him for this paper, as well as for providing me with primary sources. This paper would
not be the same without your help. I am also expressing my gratitude to the others that
helped in the realization of this project, either through advice or by providing me with
books and sources.
I would like to thank Sarah Dillard for her patience and support this year while I was
working on this project. I appreciate your editorial skills and this paper would not be half
as good without you. Further, I would also like to thank all of my friends who tolerated
me during the whole process, and did not mind me disappearing for days at time in order
to research and write. You guys have no idea how much your support has impacted this
project and my time at Macalester. I love you all!
Finally, I would like to dedicate this project to my family and my compatriots in Bosnia
and Herzegovina who have faced political marginalization through the last two decades. I
hope that one day all the issues will be just a history and that we all will live in a better
Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is my hope that this project can make an impact, no matter
how small, on the Bosnian-Herzegovinian political process.

3

Acronyms
ABH- Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Armija Bosne i Hercegovine), Bosniak Army
during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
CDC - Croatian Defense Council (Hrvatsko Vijeće Obrane), Bosnian-Herzegovinian
Croat Army during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
CDU - Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica), Croat center-right
party in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. When referenced in this paper, unless
specified otherwise, it is referring to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian branch. It has been the
main Croat party since 1990.
CDU 1990 - Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica 1990),
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CNA - Croatian National Assembly (Hrvatski Narodni Sabor), an assembly centered
around the CDU that gathers all Croat political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
DF - Democratic Front (Demokratska Fronta), leftist party in Bosnia and Herzegovina
formed in 2013 by Željko Komšić.
NHI- New Croatian Initiative (Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa), a minor Croat party during the
2000s, formed as a splinter faction of the CDU.
OHR - Office of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina
OSCE - Organization for Security and co-operation in Europe
PDA - Party for Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije), center- right Bosniak
party that has been main Bosniak party since 1990.
SDP- Social Democratic Party (Socijalno-demokratska Partija), leftist party in Bosnia
and Herzegovina started as the reformed Communist Party.
SFOR - The Stabilization Force, a NATO led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
YPA - Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija), Army of Yugoslavia
during the war.
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Introduction
Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina is a unique country. The Dayton Peace
Agreement, brokered by the Western powers after the NATO bombing campaign in the
country, stopped the greatest amount of bloodshed in Europe since WWII, but also left a
highly unstable and deeply fragmented country which is perpetually on the edge of
disintegration. Bosnia and Herzegovina lost its “Republic” prefix and became a
federation made of two entities and one district formally jointly owned by both entities.
Republika Srpska, a Serb-dominated entity functions as a unitary state, while the Bosniak
and Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a federal state made up of ten cantons
with their respective governments, laws and even police forces.1
Three of the cantons have a Croat majority, five cantons have a Bosniak majority
and two are ethnically mixed between Croats and Bosniaks.2 Brčko District, located in
the Northeast of the country, is a self-administrated condominium and is ethnically mixed
with substantial Bosniak, Croat and Serb population.3 Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement
is the current Constitution, and its implementation is overseen by the Office of the High
Representative (OHR). The High Representative, thus far always a European diplomat,
has powers to impose laws, amendment entity constitutions, fire officials and prohibit

1

Alberto Nardelli, Denis Dzidic, and Elvira Jukic, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: The World’s Most
Complicated System of Government?,” The Guardian, October 8, 2014, accessed April 8, 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/oct/08/bosnia-herzegovina-elections-the-worlds-mostcomplicated-system-of-government.
2
See Chart 1 and Map 1 in the appendix for a detailed map of the political organization of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Cantons with an ethnic Croat majority are Posavina, Zapadno-Hercegovina and Canton 10.
Cantons with ethnic Bosniak majority are Una-Sana, Tuzla, Zenica-Doboj, Sarajevo and Bosansko
Podrinje. Cantons Hercegovina (official name Hercegovačko-neretvanski) and Središnja Bosna are
ethnically mixed between Croats and Bosniaks. In Središnja Bosna Bosniak constitute a slim majority,
while in Hercegovina Croats constitute a slim majority.
3
Nardelli, Dzidic, and Jukic, “Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
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officials from holding public offices among other abilites.4 To make the matter more
complicated, the High Representative is the highest interpreter of the Constitution and is
not accountable to any institution in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and his decisions cannot be
appealed, not even to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, the
High Representative is a de facto a dictator in Bosnia and Herzegovina who can overrule
and ignore the political will of the democratically elected representatives of the three
constituent Peoples, if he sees such decisions as beneficial for Bosnia and Herzegovina.5
While the Serbs make up a vast majority of the Republika Srpska population,
Croats and Bosniaks share the Federation. According to estimates, Bosniaks are almost
four times more numerous than Croats in the Federation, and coupled with the current
election laws in the Federation, this creates ability for Bosniaks to disregard the electoral
will of Croats in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.6 It is possible for Bosniaks to
form the government of the Federation without Croat political parties which have vast
popular support among the Croats. Over the years, Croats have ended up in a politically
marginalized and unequal position in comparison with the two other constitutional ethnic
groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The aim of this article is not only to investigate how
this has happened, but also to propose possible solutions to the “Croat issue” that is
greatly contributing to the instability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and is stalling its path to
the European integration and economic development.

4

“OHR General Information,” accessed April 8, 2015, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/.
The constituent Peoples are Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. They are constituent on the whole territory of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, although Serbs mostly live in Republika Srpska, and Bosniaks and Croats mostly
live in the Federation. All other citizens, including both national minorities and people who simply declare
themselves Bosnians or Herzegovinians, together with undeclared people, form a group called the “Others”
in the constitution.
6
Pero Zelenika, “Hrvata Manje 27,3, Srba 9,3, Bošnjaka 3,5 Posto,” www.vecernji.ba, January 11, 2014,
http://www.vecernji.ba/hrvata-manje-273-srba-93-bosnjaka-35-posto-914537.
5
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The “Croat issue” is of great significance to the citizens and policymakers of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and especially to Croats whose rights and political power are
critically endangered today. It is also significant to the international community involved
in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-war reconstruction and implementation of Dayton
Agreement. The International Crisis Group in their last report on Bosnia and Herzegovina
claimed that at the moment Bosnia and Herzegovina is slowly spiraling towards
disintegration, and hinted that the “Croat issue” can be a deciding factor for the future of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.7 Thus, my research is very significant not only to academia that
is engaged in the discussion about Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the 1990s, but
it is also highly relevant to the policymakers, both Bosnian-Herzegovinian and
international. Since no one has definitely answered how Croats ended up in the secondclass citizen position that they fill now and what can be done to resolve this issue using a
variety of sources and looking at the overarching situation rather than focusing on a
specific issue, I believe that my research is highly relevant.
There is a dearth of scholarship in the English language about these issues and I
hope to fill the void and internationalize a discussion which is so vigorously debated in
Bosnian-Herzegovinian academic circles and the general population alike. The benefit of
answering my research question is the potential to illustrate possible paths that BosnianHerzegovinian policymakers should take in order to resolve this issue and impending
crisis, while the risk of not answering such an important question on time might be the
persistence of the status quo, unrest and maybe even the disintegration of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in the future. While my article will read as a policy paper with the ultimate
7

Bosnia’s Future, (International Crisis Group, Europe Report N°232, July 10, 2014), i,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/232-bosnia-s-future.
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goal of policymakers implementing or at least taking my findings into consideration, I
will also reference the academic discussion on this topic that is being held in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, especially in the political science journal “Status”.
My main argument is that Croats lost many rights through changes and
amendments to the Washington Agreement and misinterpretations of the Dayton
Agreement that were mostly perpetuated by the Office of the High Representative for
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that the internal reorganization of Bosnia and Herzegovina
is essential if the country is to survive. Quite simply, Croats are not on a politically equal
position with the Bosniaks and Serbs, and this creates a lot of friction that might reignite
the Bosnian-Herzegovinian powder keg if this issue is not resolved. The changes by the
High Representatives (there have been seven office holders since 1995), especially those
concerning Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, diminished Croat rights over time and
culminated in the election of Komšić as Croat member of the Presidency without Croat
support.
In order to resolve the crisis I will suggest a variety of possible approaches to the
internal reorganization of Bosnia and Herzegovina and legal guarantees for equal rights
of all its citizens. The possible approaches to the present political crisis are the creation of
a third entity (with a Croat majority), making Bosnia and Herzegovina a union of three
republics, regionalization of the country, dissolution of the entities and the cantonization
of a whole country, a return to the original Washington Agreements, a unitary and
centralized Bosnia and Herzegovina and a status quo. I will analyze all of these possible
solutions and list the benefits and dangers of each, although I believe that the third entity
would be the best solution in order to protect rights of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina
8

and stabilize the situation in the country. The “Others” (national minorities and citizens
who do not declare themselves members of one of the three constituent Peoples in Bosnia
and Herzegovina) are also in a politically unequal situation. Their position is not the
focus of my research and it is a topic for further analysis. While I acknowledge that all
Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizens are not equal at the moment, I will focus solely on the
inequalities currently experienced by the Croats, especially in contrast with two other
constituent Peoples.

Methodology
In order to support my thesis I will use a variety of methods and sources. I have
included the most relevant books and journal articles written in Croatian, Bosnian,
Serbian and English about this topic. These sources are written using, but not limited to,
historical, political, economic, juridical and sociological approaches to the topic. Also, I
will use analyses performed by the Institute for Political and Social Research in Mostar
and reports by the International Crisis Group. I will in addition use the interview I
conducted with Mr. Vladimir Šoljić, the Minister of Defense of the Croatian Republic of
Herzeg-Bosnia during the war and president of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
in 1997. Today he is president of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, the main
cultural Croat institution in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I will also use a variety of news
articles, analysis done by political scientists for state officials, official government
documents and websites that have published in relation to this topic.
My approach is a fresh one, because no one has used such a variety of sources
before while looking at a general over-arching situation rather than focusing on a specific

9

sub-issue in the English language. I will start my article by giving a thorough historical
overview of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the last days of Yugoslavia up to the Dayton
Peace Agreement in order to give readers a much needed background that will shed light
on the reasons why Bosnia and Herzegovina is organized as it is and why the “Croat
issue” is a relevant issue today. I will give special emphasis to the Muslim-Croat civil
war and its impact that resulted in the Washington Treaty. I will then look at the
immediate post-war period between 1995 and 2000 which was, despite crimes in Central
Bosnia against people trying to return to their homes, generally a positive time for Croats
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I will then examine the last decade and one half when Croats
were gradually stripped of any political rights through the actions by Bosniak parties and
decisions by the High Representatives. This gradual deconstruction of Croat political
rights started in 2001 with the establishment of the “Alliance for Changes” that excluded
political parties who received the most Croat votes from Federal government. I will then
give special attention to the Croatian Home Rule and the way it was suppressed by the
international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I shall then proceed to analyze the
current issues of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina which include political and economic
discrimination against them in the Federation. The most famous instance of this
discrimination were two elections of Željko Komšić as Croat member of the Presidency
with largely Bosniak votes and the formation of Federal government in 2010. I will then
proceed to offer possible solutions and evaluate their advantages and disadvantages. I
will then conclude my article with my predictions of what may happen and a suggestion
of what both the international community and Bosnian-Herzegovinian politicians should
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do to resolve the “Croat issue” and allow Bosnia and Herzegovina to finally begin
ascension to the EU.

A historical overview of modern Bosnia and Herzegovina up to the Dayton Peace
Agreement
Bosnia and Herzegovina has always had a turbulent and rather difficult history. Its
history today is highly politicized and skewed by all three constituent Peoples who
(mis)use this history to legitimize their own political agendas and projects. Today’s
Bosnia and Herzegovina was controlled throughout the centuries by Illyrians, Romans,
Slavs (both of Latin and Eastern rite), Hungarians, Ottoman Turks and the Hapsburg
Monarchy. 8 All three Peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina have very different views of
their shared history. For example, while for some Ottoman Turks are seen as villains who
enslaved the Slavs, for others they are a relatively good force who brought Islam and
progress to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Still, pre-19th century Bosnian-Herzegovinian
history is not really all that important for this article and its many quasi-historical national
myths have no place in serious academic work. One such myth, which is used today by
the mostly Bosniak pro-unitary state elements is the common national Bosnian identity of
Peoples living in Bosnia and Herzegovina. People living in Bosnia and Herzegovina did
peacefully coexist during most of their history, but there was never a joint national
identity in which Croats, Muslims9 and Serbs would identify as Bosnians and

8

Charles R. Shrader, The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History, 1992-1994, 1
edition (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003), 5-7.
9
(Bosnian) Muslims was a national/ethnic name used by the Bosniaks before 1993, when they decided to
rename their ethnic group Bosniaks. To respect this decision and also be consistent, I will use these two
terms (Muslim, Bosniak) interchangeably when talking about Bosniaks and their history before 1993. I will
use “Bosniaks” only when talking about them after 1993.
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Herzegovinians.10 Rather, Bosnian and Herzegovinan were terms for geographical or
regional identity, which is one of the many identities that people in Bosnia and
Herzegovina simultaneously have, together with their ethnic and religious identities.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, all associations and cultural clubs in
Bosnia and Herzegovina were monoethnic Croat, Muslim or Serb clubs rather than (joint)
Bosnian-Herzegovinian clubs.11 In the nineteen century people in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, under the influence of the greater Romantic Movement in Europe, started to
form ethnic identities that are crystalized today.12 Austria-Hungary assumed power over
Bosnia and Herzegovina after more than four centuries of Ottoman rule in 1878. After the
defeat of the Central Powers in WWI Bosnia and Herzegovina was, together with other
Austro-Hungarian territories inhabited by South Slavs and Kingdoms of Serbia and
Montenegro, joined into the Serb-dominated Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians.13
This kingdom was later re-named the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. After the fall of
Yugoslavia in 1941, the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina was incorporated into the
Independent State of Croatia, a Nazi puppet state led by extreme Croatian nationalists and
supported by some Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina.14
During WWII Bosnia and Herzegovina was the site of many massacres and
horrible crimes committed by German and Italian occupation forces, the puppet Ustasha
government (which included both Croatian and Muslim officials), Serb nationalistic and
pro-monarchist Chetnik units and multiethnic Communist Partisan forces headed by the
10

Mirjana Kasapović, “Bosna i Hercegovina: Deset Godina Nakon Daytona,” STATUS Magazin Za
Političku Kulturu I Društvena Pitanja, no. 9 (Spring 2006): 54.
11
Ibid, 55.
12
Shrader, The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History, 1992-1994, 7-9.
13
Ibid, 9.
14
Ibid, 10-11.
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charismatic but ruthless Marshal Josip Broz Tito.15 These war crimes along with the
massacres of surrendered Chetnik and Ustasha soldiers, as well as some civilians by
Tito’s partisans immediately after the end of WWII left long-simmering animosity and
hatred among the three ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina.16 Still, this hatred was
buried beneath the surface by the totalitarian Communist regime of Yugoslavia for more
than four decades and only reappeared in the 1980s after the death of Tito.17 During this
period Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the six Socialist republics that made up the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Bosnia and Herzegovina was unique in this
regard because it was officially a republic of three constituent Peoples: Croats, Muslims
and Serbs, in contrast to Slovenia or Macedonia which were countries of Slovenian and
Macedonian people respectively. Bosnia and Herzegovina was the most ethnically mixed
region in the former Yugoslavia.
In 1990 the three main national parties that would dominate BosnianHerzegovinian political life in the 1990s were formed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
main Muslim party was the Party for Democratic Action (PDA) centered around Alija
Izetbegović.18 Serbs mostly supported the Serbian Democratic Party led by Radovan
Karadžić19, while the Croats gathered around the Croatian Democratic Union (CDU) of
Bosnia and Herzegovina that changed many leaders in the 1990s, but the most prominent
one was Mate Boban.20 All the mentioned parties had branches in at least one other
Yugoslavian Republic, and the CDU of Bosnia and Herzegovina was actually a branch of
15

Ibid, 11.
Ivo Lučić, Uzroci Rata: Bosna i Hercegovina od 1980. do 1992. godine (Zagreb: Despot Infinitus, 2013),
21.
17
Shrader, The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History, 1992-1994, 11.
18
Lučić, Uzroci Rata: Bosna i Hercegovina od 1980. do 1992. godine, 258-9.
19
Ibid, 260-1.
20
Ibid, 262-3.
16
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the CDU from Croatia led by the first Croatian President Franjo Tuđman.21 On the 25th of
June 1991 Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia and skirmishes
had already began in Croatia between Croatian Army and Serb paramilitary units backed
by the Yugoslav People’s Army, soon leading to a full-fledged war.22 It was obvious that
the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina would not last for long unless all three ethnic
groups made an agreement on what kind of future they wanted for their ethnic group and
for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole.
In March of 1991, Bosnia and Herzegovina held a census. The results were used
many times in peace proposals during the war. According to the census, Bosnia and
Herzegovina had a population of 4,377,033 citizens. Just under 1.9 million or 43.4 % of
them declared themselves as Muslims, a bit less than 1.37 million or 31.2 % as Serbs and
some 760 thousand or 17.4 % as Croats.23 Out of the remaining 350 thousand people,
some 240 thousand declared themselves Yugoslavs and the others were either national
minorities, like Hungarians, or undeclared citizens.24 Therefore, over 92% of the
Bosnian-Herzegovinian population considered themselves to be a part of one of the three
main ethnic groups. The first democratic elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina were held
on the 18th of November 1990. These elections confirmed that all three main ethnic
groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina were polarized and would chose to gather around their
ethnic parties rather than to show support for multiethnic parties or reformed

21

Ibid, 241.
Ibid, 318-9.
23
Etnička Obilježja Stanovništva: Rezultati Za Republiku I Po Opštinama - 1991. (Sarajevo: ZAVOD ZA
STATISTIKU REPUBLIKE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE, October 1993), 10-11,
http://www.fzs.ba/Dem/Popis/Etnicka%20obiljezja%20stanovnistva%20bilten%20233.pdf.
24
Ibid, 10-11.
22
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communists.25 At these elections, the last ones until after 1996, the three national parties
together got more than 84% of seats in parliament and all seven seats in the Presidency.26
It was clear that national parties and their policies had the overwhelming support of their
respective ethnic groups.
The Serbs wanted to keep Bosnia and Herzegovina in Yugoslavia which was
becoming increasingly unitary and Serb-dominated, but they were also open to joining
parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina that they considered Serb to Serbia, while the other
parts could gain some sort of independence.27 Muslims wanted an independent Bosnia
and Herzegovina that would be a unitary centralized republic, which would then be
dominated by their group through the dominance of sheer numbers.28 Croats, the least
numerous group, supported the confederative model for an independent Bosnia and
Herzegovina.29 Still, certain groups among Croat leaders, especially during the MuslimCroat War when the breakup of Bosnia and Herzegovina was appearing imminent, would
not have minded seceding parts populated mostly by Croats from Bosnia and
Herzegovina and joining them with the Republic of Croatia.30
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, at least for Croats, started on the 1st of
October 1991 when the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) and the Serbian and
Montenegrin reserve forces razed 22 Croat villages and hamlets including Ravno in

25

Ibid, 286-8.
Ibid, 287.
27
Saša Mrduljaš, “HRVATSKA POLITIKA UNUTAR BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE U KONTEKSTU
DEKLARATIVNOGA I REALNOGA PROSTORNOG OPSEGA HRVATSKE ZAJEDNICE /
REPUBLIKE HERCEG-BOSNE (1991.–1994.),” Društvena istraživanja 18, no. 4–5 (102–103) (October
30, 2009): 826–27.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid
30
Kasapović, “Bosna i Hercegovina: Deset Godina Nakon Daytona,” 60.
26
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Eastern Herzegovina to the ground.31 The YPA did this in order to secure a flank and
gain better artillery positions for shelling neighboring Dubrovnik, Croatia’s southernmost
city. At this point, war in Croatia was in full swing and rebel Serb paramilitary forces
supported by the YPA were sieging multiple cities and ethnically cleansing villages and
towns all over Croatia. The destruction of Ravno and other Croat villages by the YPA
was a clear violation of Bosnian-Herzegovinian sovereignty within Yugoslavia and an act
of aggression against the Croat population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nonetheless, Alija
Izetbegović, the main Muslim leader and the acting President of the seven-member
Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not react to it, saying this is not “their war”.32
Tensions mounted from that point on and almost everyone anticipated war.
During 1991 Serbs started organizing and consolidating municipalities in which
Serbs were the majority of population. Five autonomous communities were organized,
each of them functioning as an autonomous country within Bosnia and Herzegovina. On
the 9th of January 1992, these formed the self-proclaimed Serb Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina which would adopt its own constitution and de facto declare independence
from Bosnia and Herzegovina on the 28th of February 1992.33 The self-proclaimed Serb
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina also passed the decision to join Yugoslavia (then
comprised of just Serbia and Montenegro). Muslims too were organizing and arming
themselves in the anticipation of the war. On the 31st of March 1991 the Patriotic League

31

Lučić, Uzroci Rata: Bosna i Hercegovina od 1980. do 1992. godine, 329.
Ibid, 330.
33
Ibid, 335-6.
32
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(a Muslim paramilitary group dominated by Party for Democratic Action members) was
formed.34
Finally, Croats were also organizing and arming themselves. Croats proclaimed
their Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia on the 18th of November 1991, the very
same day that the defense of the city of Vukovar in Croatia fell and atrocities were
committed against civilians and prisoners of war.35 Its proclamation resulted out of
distrust of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian government and fear that the same destiny that
Croats in Croatia were experiencing was awaiting Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina as
well.36 Still, it is important to note that this Community, which will later rename itself the
Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, never officially declared separation or secession
from Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is in contrast to Serb Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, later renamed Republika Srpska. The Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosina
de iure remained in Bosnia and Herzegovina, even though there were secessionist
tendencies among its leadership, especially during the Muslim-Croat War. De facto it was
closely aligned with the Republic of Croatia.37
In early 1992, Croat and Muslim leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed that
Bosnia and Herzegovina should gain independence from Yugoslavia and they organized
an independence referendum that was held on the 29th of February and the 1st of March
1992. The referendum was boycotted by the Serbs and the Serbian Democratic Party
voiced disapproval.38 Around 64.3% of voters voted on the referendum, representing
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almost every Croat and Muslim voter. More than 99.4% of voters who turned up for the
referendum voted for an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on March 3rd
President Izetbegović declared independence, despite the fact that the referendum did not
have support of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.39
Bosnia and Herzegovina was officially recognized on 6th of April by the US and
many European countries, but the war had already been raging by then.40 Serb
paramilitary forces, backed up by the YPA, were already skirmishing with Muslim and
Croat militias and ethically cleansing areas in Northern, Central and Eastern Bosnia. In
April, the siege of Sarajevo was already under-way and thousands of Muslim refugees
were fleeing Eastern Bosnia, finding safe havens in ethnically mixed Croat-Muslim
Central Bosnia.41 Croats on the 8th of April 1992 formed the Croatian Defense Council
(CDC), a Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croat army, with the goal of resisting further Serb
attacks.42 Muslims formed the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABH), officially a state
army, but heavily dominated by Muslims which comprised a vast majority of its units.43
The CDC and ABH cooperated to halt Serb aggression in 1992 and parts of 1993, but
between 1993 and 1994 they were engaged in a civil war.
Even as early as 1992 there were sporadic skirmishes between Croat and Muslim
units, but often not much more than the usual fights between soldiers for loot or for
honour.44 During this time, the Republic of Croatia sent a substantial aid in weapons,
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supplies, money and experts to the CDC and some Croatian Army units were included in
the fighting against Serbs side-by-side with the CDC and ABH. The CDC was officially a
part of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with ABH, and this
alliance seemed solid.45 Croatia was also the only route from which the Sarajevo
government could receive weapons and supplies, because they were surrounded by Serbs
on all other sides. Croatia even accepted some 450,000 Muslim refugees, mostly women
and children, and provided them with shelter and food, thus increasing friendly relations
between Croats and Muslims.46 Nonetheless, the relations between the CDC and ABH
went poorly after the fall of Jajce on the 29th of October 1992.47 Jajce was a relatively big
town in Central Bosnia that was defended by both the CDC and ABH units. Because of
lack of proper cooperation and the superior firepower of the Serb forces, Jajce fell,
leaving thousands of Croats and Muslims to find refuge in Central Bosnia. Croat refugees
went further to Croat-dominated Western Herzegovina, while the Bosniak refugees
stayed around Travnik in Central Bosnia.48 Croat and Muslims started blaming each other
for the fall of Jajce, creating a very hostile environment.
The Vance-Owen Peace Plan that had the aim of stopping the war and creating a
federal Bosnia and Herzegovina consisting of three Serb, three Muslim and three Croat
cantons (with Sarajevo as an ethnically neutral canton and a capital) was signed by all
three sides, but was never ratified.49 The CDC was supposed to assume control over the
ABH units in Croat cantons, while the ABH would assume control over the CDC in
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Muslim cantons. Soon Bosnian-Herzegovinian Serbs held a referendum about the plan,
rejecting it. ABH headquarter rejected to put ABH units in command of the CDC in Croat
cantons, despite Croats already trying to achieve this on the ground due to the
negotiations of Vance-Owen Peace Plan.50 This decision spared tensions that ignited the
conflict and started another war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The main problem was that
Canton number 10, which was on an area of much of Central Bosnia, had a slim Croat
majority before the war, but with thousands of refugees coming from Eastern Bosnia and
finding shelter there, Muslims had the actual majority in 1993. Moreover, Muslims, who
made up 44% of population were cornered on some 15% of Bosnian-Herzegovinian
territory. They needed Central Bosnia to house their refugees and they desperately
needed arms factories in Vitez and Novi Travnik controlled by the CDC.51
As a result of both the CDC and the ABH clinging onto this important area and
refusing to leave it under control of the other ethnic group, skirmishes occurred all across
Central Bosnia in March 1993. The full blown war did not start until the 16th of April
later that year.52 On that day CDC took over a strategically important village of Ahmići
that connected two Croat enclaves in central Bosnia, massacring around 110 Bosniaks.53
The very same day in the nearby Konjic municipality the ABH massacred 22 Croats in
the village Trusina.54 Vitez, headquarters of the CDC in Central Bosnia was shelled by
ABH on the same day and the war between Muslims and Croats was in full swing. It is
important to note that the CDC had some 8,000 soldiers in Central Bosnia, while the
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ABH had between 82,000 and 84,000 thousands, making the ratio 10:1 in favor of the
ABH.55 While all CDC soldiers were in fighting units, the ABH had some 25,000 in
frontline units and the rest in reserve, making the actual ration closer to 3:1. We should
keep in mind that Croats could not replenish their losses while the Muslims could, based
on the reserve. ABH also had more artillery pieces, so Croat enclaves in Central Bosnia
were under siege from the start of the conflict until the ceasefire in 1994.56
Because the CDC was so outgunned and outnumbered, they used the doctrine of
active defense, committing some crimes like Ahmići in the process.57 The ABH
committed crimes as well, especially their Mujahedeen fighters that flocked from Islamic
countries to take part in what they saw as Jihad between Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims
and Bosnian-Herzegovinian Christians. Mujahedeens committed many gruesome crimes
during the war, like ritual beheadings. A few thousand Mujahedeens fought in ABH
units, even forming a 1,800 strong “El Mujahedeen” battalion, adding a religious element
to the conflict.58 More than 100,000 Croats were expelled from Central Bosnia by the
ABH, while some 50,000 Muslims were expelled by the CDC, forever creating animosity
between the two ethnic groups.59 The Republic of Croatia supported the CDC with arms,
supplies and volunteers during the conflict, and because of that there was international
pressure on Tuđman to stop the aid or else face sanctions like Yugoslavia was facing at
that time. The US managed, under the threat of sanctions, to bring both sides to the
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negotiation table and broker a peace with the Washington Treaty that was signed on the
18th of March 1994.60
The agreement stopped the war between the ABH and the CDC and effectively
made them allies against the Serbs once again. It also created the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, a Croat-Bosniak entity. The Washington Treaty was not an ideal
solution for Croats because they had to share one entity with Bosniaks, but it was still
better than the continuation of the war that was disastrous for both sides, as well as the
prospect of the complete ethnic disappearance from Central Bosnia. The original text of
the Treaty gave a lot of power to the cantons, which were effectively federal units within
the Federation with their own laws and government. Still, once this Treaty began to be
amended by the High Representatives Croats were slowly to become second-class
citizens in the Federation.
On the 11th of July 1995 the Serbs captured Srebrenica, a small Bosniak enclave
in Eastern Bosnia and massacred more than 8,000 boys and men in only a few days.61
This act of genocide created outrage in the international community, which decided that it
was time to act more deliberately to stop the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The same
fate was threatening the city of Bihać in late July 1995, and the ABH, the CDC and the
Croatian Army arranged a joint military command and prepared operations that had the
main objective of taking over Serb-held areas, effectively ending the war.62 The Croatian
Army, the CDC and the ABH managed to take over large areas of territory from the
Serbs in July, August and September of 1995. The war in Croatia was effectively over
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and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina had such losses that they were forced to the
negotiation table. The bombing campaign Operation Deliberate Force by NATO in
Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Bosnian Serb Army also helped to bring their
leadership to the negotiations.63 The results of these negotiations was Dayton Peace
Agreement signed on the 14th of December 1995, effectively ending the war in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, even though some violence sporadically occurred long into 1996.
By the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina was politically divided
into two entities: Republika Srpska with a Serb majority and Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina with a Bosniak and Croat majority. The area of the Federation was changed
from the one agreed to in the Washington Treaty and after which the Federation was
composed of ten cantons on 51% of Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory, a change from the
original map of the Federation that was composed of eight cantons on 58% of BosnianHerzegovinian territory.64 The three cantons in the Federation had Croat ethnic majority,
five cantons had Bosniak ethnic majority. Two cantons, in Central Bosnia and Neretva
regions were the fighting during Muslim-Croat civil war were the heaviest, were
ethnically mixed cantons with roughly half Croat and half Bosniak population. The
Dayton Agreement also created the Office of the High Representative and some 60,000
UN troops were deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina to secure peace. Today, there are
still 600 EUFOR troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who succeeded UN troops in their
task to oversee the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement.65
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In short, no one was satisfied with the Dayton Agreement. Serbs were not happy
that they were forced to stay in independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, although they
received their own entity on which they make up around 90% of the population, and hope
that they might secede one day.66 Bosniaks were uneasy about Republika Srpska and are
still afraid that it might one day secede. They are also afraid that Croat territories in
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat municipalities in the Federation) might also try to secede,
which would leave a Bosniak state surrounded by Croatian and Serbian countries.
Consequently, they want a unitary state and the abolition of the Dayton Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which in Bosniak opinion is a result of genocide of Bosniaks.67 Croats, on
the other hand, are against the disparity that the Dayton brought and they demand their
own entity in order to prevent losing political rights, as is happening in the Bosniak
dominated Federation in which Croats make up just over 20% of the population.68
Therefore, no one was happy with the agreement, but at least it ended the war and
allowed Bosnia and Herzegovina to remain an independent country. Hostilities between
the three ethnic groups are still very much alive, and conflict has continued since the
Dayton Agreement. The conflict is now political rather than militant. The years between
the Dayton Agreement and 2001 were generally seen as good years during which much
of the country was rebuilt, and some refugees returned to their homes.
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The golden age for Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The years between 1996 and the end of 2000 are generally seen as the golden age
for Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina.69 During this time Croats, despite having to share
the Federation with the Bosniaks instead of having their own entity like the Serbs,
enjoyed a great political freedom and relative economic prosperity.70 They were able to
freely elect their own representatives in the canton, Federation and state levels, and they
were politically equal with the Bosniaks in the Federation. During this time a lot of
infrastructure in Bosnia and Herzegovina was rebuilt, and Croats also enjoyed financial
support from the Republic of Croatia. Moreover, Croat refugees slowly started going
back to their homes in most of Central Bosnia, although not nearly in the same numbers
that were expelled during the war. Consequently, today this area has substantially less
Croats than it did in 1991.71 Their return to parts of Central Bosnia next to Croat enclaves
that survived the war was more sustainable due to a substantial number of Croats in that
region that stayed during the war, especially in contrast to Central-East Bosnia or
Northern Bosnia. These parts had a substantial number of Croat refugees who never
returned to their homes. Tensions were still high, and sporadic acts of violence were
common, but the country was slowly transitioning to the peaceful period. During this
period, Croats had their own TV station and enjoyed substantial cultural and educational
autonomy in their own language, as education is administered by Cantons rather than at
the Federal or state level.
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The Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia was formally dissolved on the 14th of
August 1996 and it transferred its power and “Croat legitimacy” to the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, but even today Croats are celebrating its establishment on the
18th of November.72 On the 14th of September 1996, the very first post-war elections were
held with a record turnout of almost 80%. The CDU candidate Krešimir Zubak won
almost 89% of Croat votes, while the Party for Democratic Action candidate Alija
Izetbegović won 80% of Bosniak votes, and the Serbian Democratic Party candidate
Momčilo Krajišnik won 67% of Serb votes.73 This showed that the same three national
parties that were in power during the war still had overwhelming support from their
respective ethnic groups.
The main problem during this time period, together with war scars and hostile
political rhetoric, was that of refugee return. Despite good efforts by international
organizations, thousands of refugees never returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina. They
either could not return due to economic problems or ethnic hostilities, or just chose to live
in more prosperous countries. Most of them permanently immigrated to Western Europe
and North America, as well as Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. During the conflict, 65%
of Croats were displaced and driven away from their homes, some internally, and some as
refugees and asylum seekers.74 This is a staggering number, especially in comparison
with the 53% of Bosniaks and 52% of Serbs that were displaced during the same time.75
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Refugees mostly returned to places where their ethnic group was dominant, and did not
really return in significant numbers to places in which they were a minority due to a
combination of fear and lack of a jobs and opportunities for a sustainable future.
Therefore, Croats returned only to parts of Central Bosnia, while the other parts in
which they had substantial population before the conflict, like Kakanj and Bugojno did
not see much return. The return rate to the Posavina region (Northern Bosnia) in
Republika Srpska was even worse and today only a fraction of the pre-war Croat
population lives here.76 In general, populations of all three ethnic groups mostly returned
or relocated to the parts of the country in which their ethnic group was a majority. Thus
Croats never really returned in great numbers to parts of Central Bosnia from which they
were ethnically cleansed during the war.77
The war changed the ethnic map and cemented ethnic divisions. There was no
town or city in Bosnia and Herzegovina during this period, which is also mostly true
today, that did not have a substantial ethnic majority of one of the three Peoples.78
According to estimates and looking into electoral statistics, most towns and cities today
are ethnically dominated by one group, and those which are not completely dominated as
a whole, as is the case with Mostar, are divided into different ethnic neighborhoods. The
era of multiethnic towns ended with the war, and all three ethnic groups are largely
solidified on their new ethnic territories.79 Therefore, during this golden period for
Croats, the three ethnic groups largely coexisted next to one another, but they did not mix
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or share joint identities. Effectively, the area that the three armies in Bosnia and
Herzegovina controlled in December 1995 became de facto new ethnic territories of three
groups, and they did not always coincide with the ethnic map from 1991 when most of
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s towns and municipalities were partially ethnically mixed.
A large issue from late 1990s for Croats was the question of Mujahedeen foreign
fighters, some of whom gained Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizenship after the war and
created significant instability in Central Bosnia due to their connections to Al-Qaida and
other terrorist and radical Islamist groups. They committed bombing attacks of Croat
churches and private houses in Central Bosnia during this period, as well as a few
massacres of refugees in Central Bosnia, further raising hostilities and creating distrust
between Croats and Bosniaks.80 These crimes and massacres were often left unsolved and
their investigations were often obstructed by Bosniak elements in police and politics,
resulting in a more difficult return of refugees.81
The incidents were carefully investigated by Jozo Leutar, a Croat who was the
Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs in the Federation from 1996 to 1999, and a strong
voice who warned against the radical Islamist violence that Croat refugees were targeted
by.82 He was assassinated when a bomb exploded under his car in March 1999, and until
today no one has been sentenced for this terrorist act.83 Even though crimes against
refugees returning home and the assassination of Leutar created more distrust between
Croats and Bosniaks,84 this period was a political golden age in Bosnia and Herzegovina
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for Croats during which they enjoyed the same rights as Bosniaks and Serbs. Two
incidents marked the end of this period and ushered in a new era of Croat history in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, an era of diminished Croat rights when they became secondclass citizens and created Croat distrust towards the international community in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
The first event was a forceful eviction of Croats from Drvar, Grahovo and
Glamoč by SFOR units in 1998. These municipalities were predominantly Serb before
the war, but in 1995 they were taken by the CDC and Croat refugees from other parts of
Bosnia and Herzegovina relocated into empty Serb houses that were abandoned by the
Serbs while fleeing the CDC.85 Most of them were finally evicted in 2002 in order to
allow Serb refugees to return. What left a bitter memory for Croats was the fact that the
international community and SFOR took part in these evictions, while they did not do the
same in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those Croats in these municipalities
eventually left for Western Europe and Croatia rather than returning to their original
homes in Bosnia and Herzegovina from which they fled during the war, despite trying to
stay in their temporary homes in these three municipalities.86 Because of this incident,
Croats felt targeted by the international community, in a way that further radicalized them
in wanting to gain more autonomy or to eventually connect Croat territories in Bosnia
and Herzegovina to Croatia proper.
The other event, that marked the end of this “golden period”, was the forced
closure of Erotel, the Croat TV channel in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the 17th of
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February 2000.87 SFOR units closed the TV station because it illegally broadcast
significant amounts of programing from Croatian Radio Television, the main Croatian
public channel in the Republic of Croatia, even though Croatian Radio Television did not
mind this at all. Also, the goal of the international community was to create a Federal TV
that would be the main public TV for Croats and Bosniaks in the Federation and thus
encourage cooperation between these two groups. Federal TV was established in October
2001, and the Erotel infrastructure and journalists were incorporated into this new TV
station that was supposed to deliver news and programing in both Croatian and Bosnian
languages.88
Still, most of the program is done in the Bosnian language and Croats do not see
Federal TV as their TV channel, but rather as Bosniak TV.89 This means that Croats do
not have a TV channel in their own language, thus putting them in unequal position in
comparison with Serbs and Bosniaks, because they cannot access information from Croat
sources on public TV.90 Federal TV can be highly politicized, often favoring Bosniaks,
and thus it is not hard to understand why Croats want its dissolution and the
establishment their own TV channel. Even today, most Croats refuse to pay the required
TV subscription, and since 2005 the CDU tried to push for TV station in the Croatian
language through the parliament, but all the efforts thus far has been fruitless due to
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obstructions by Bosniak political parties.91 In a way, the Erotel case was just a dress
rehearsal of reforms that happened in 2000 and 2001, which had the goal to create a more
“civic” and “multiethnic” Federation, but which put Croats in a marginalized political
position in comparison to Bosniaks. In a desperate attempt to resist these reforms,
disgruntled Croats declared home-rule and de facto seceded from the Federation for a few
months in 2001, but did not secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina itself.

The marginalization of Croats and the Croatian Home Rule
In October 2000, just a month before the elections held on the 11th of November,
Robert Barry, chief of the OSCE mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, suggested electoral
amendments and changed the way officials are elected to the House of Peoples of the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.92 The Federation’s parliament is bicameral, with
a House of Representatives acting as the lower house. Its members are elected in their
electoral units by popular vote, in a fashion very similar to the one used in parliaments in
national unitary countries in Europe. The Federal House of Peoples is an upper house
with the goal of representing Peoples (originally Bosniaks and Croats, later on also Serbs)
in the Federation, giving them veto powers to any law or decision by the House of
Representatives that goes against vital national interests of their respective constituent
Peoples.93 The reason why this house exists is to provide Croats with a legal mechanism
to veto the laws that might be bad for their vital national interests in the Federation, due
to the fact that Bosniaks dominate the House of Representatives by sheer numbers and
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could form a government without any Croat party. The idea was that such a government
could not function then, because all its decisions would be vetoed by the Croat Club in
the House of Peoples, thus protecting less numerous Croats from political marginalization
in the Federation.
This system functioned well between 1996 and 2000 and Croats used vetos
frequently to protect their rights and interests, but with Barry’s amendments to the
electoral laws, Croats de facto lost this vital mechanism to protect their interests in the
Federation. Originally, the Federal House of Representatives had 140 members. The
House of Peoples had 30 Bosniaks, 30 Croats and a proportional number of “Others”,
who is a term used for national minorities and other citizens which are not ethnically
Bosniak, Croat or Serb.94 Barry’s amendments to the Federal electoral laws allowed that
representatives in the House of Peoples, elected from Cantonal assemblies, can be
nominated and elected by anyone in the cantonal assembly, not only the members of that
ethnic group.95 So, now it is possible for Bosniak members of the Cantonal assembly to
vote and choose Croat representatives to the Federal House of Peoples from that Canton,
which is especially evident in a Bosnia-Podrinje Canton where there is less than a handful
of Croats.96
Also, until the 2002 amendments created by High Representative Wolfgang
Petritsch, Serbs were not constituent in the Federation, and were considered “Others” for
political purposes, as well as Croats and Bosniaks were considered “Others” in Republika
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Srpska. His sets of amendments to the Federal Constitution, reducing the number of
members in the House of Representatives to 98, which effectively reduced the
proportional number of Croats that could be in this house of the Parliament.97 Moreover,
they added a quota of a minimum of six members of each constituent Peoples in the
House of Representatives, even though that also meant that the Serbs would receive more
members than their proportional share of population in the Federation. This brought in
the possibility that the Croats, but especially Bosniaks, might elect these members merely
by their sheer numbers. Thus Serb members of the parliament might be ethnically Serb
but support Bosniak and Croat policies and interests, rather than Serb ones.
The Petritschs’s 2002 amendments to the Constitution concerning the Federal
House of Peoples were drastic and are at the root of almost all current political problems
that Croats face in the Federation. The amendments made Serbs constituent People in the
Federation, and Croats and Bosniaks in Republika Srpska. Although this sounds good in
theory and it was supposed to increase multiculturalism and cooperation between ethnic
groups, in practice it caused even more problems. The Federation was originally designed
as a Croat-Bosniak entity, and adding Serbs to this mix complicated things and left a lot
of room for abusing this decision. Today we have a situation when Bosniak politicians
run as “Serb” or “Croat” candidates, and thanks to Bosniak votes, get positions in the
parliament that are by Constitution reserved for less numerous Croats and Serbs.98
The House of Peoples members were originally elected from Cantonal
assemblies, with mostly Bosniak cantons electing Bosniak members, and Croat cantons
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electing Croat members, number of members from one ethnic group proportional to the
number of people from that ethnic group living in that canton.99 Even in Bosniak
Cantons’ assemblies, only Croats were electing Croat representatives for the House of
Peoples, and vice versa. After Petritschs’s amendments, instead of 30 Bosniaks and 30
Croats and a proportional number of “Others”, 17 Bosniaks, 17 Croats, 17 Serbs and 7
Others are elected to the House of Peoples.100 This made Barry’s already bad
amendments even worse, because now it is easier for Bosniaks to elect Croats and Serbs
to the Federal House of Peoples, taking into consideration that the number of Croat
representatives was almost halved. The constituent status of Serbs, only a few thousand
of which remain in the Federation, does not make sense. It puts them in an “equal”
position with the Croats and Bosniaks in the Federation, while Parliament in Republika
Srpska has only one house and lacks a House of Representatives, even though it has the
largely ineffective Council of Peoples that does not have as much weight as the Federal
House of Peoples. Therefore, the present system is asymmetrical.
Still, before all of these amendments by High Representative Petritschs further
worsen Croat political position, Barry’s amendment said that at least one member of each
constituent Peoples would be elected from each Canton. While this sounds fine in theory,
this means that the Bosnia-Podrinje Canton, where Bosniaks make up 99% of population
and there are only a few Croats, elects one Croat representative, while Posavina Canton,
in which Croats make up more than 66% of constituency and there are more than 30,000
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Croats also elects one Croat in the House of Peoples.101 In reality, this means that
Bosniaks can elect 6 Croat members from 5 Cantons (one of Bosniak Canton elects two
Croat members) with Bosniak majority, while Croats in theory could elect only 3 Bosniak
members from 3 Cantons with Croat majority.102 If we keep in mind that it takes at least
2/3 of representatives in the National Club (Croat, Serb and Bosniak) of the House of
Peoples to veto a law, it means that Bosniaks can elect 1/3 of Croat representatives in the
House of Peoples and prevent Croats from using veto laws, which actually happened
during the last term.103 At the same time, Croats cannot influence Bosniak Club in any
way, so they do not even try to do so.104 It is important to keep in mind that originally
only 1/2 of votes in a club were enough for a veto, but this changed with the 2002
amendments by the High Representative Petritsch who raised this value to 2/3.105
This means that in the Federation, according to current laws, it is entirely possible
to form a Federal government without any Croat representatives that were elected by
Croat votes. This marginalized Croats, removing all political rights on the Federal level
from them. Taking into consideration that more than 90% of Croats in Bosnia and
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Herzegovina live in the Federation, this effectively means that Croats do not have the
same political rights and are not equal to Bosniaks and Serbs.106
In order to protest Barry’s amendments, which preceded much harsher Petritsch’s
amendments that I mentioned above, only two weeks after implementation of Barry’s
amendments, the CDU, the main Croat party that enjoyed close to 90% of Croat support
then, decided to organize a Croatian National Assembly in the town of Novi Travnik.
During their first session, they elected the leadership of this Parliament, which largely
coincided with the CDU’s leadership. Also, they decided that on the 11th of November
Croats will not only vote in elections, but will also vote on a referendum about whether
they support the Croatian National Assembly (CNA) as a highest institution of Croats in
Bosnia and Herzegovina to possess “Croat legitimacy” or not. Over 90% of Croat voters
supported this referendum question.107 CDU also got almost 90% of Croat votes on this
election, and they won 25 seats out of 140 in the Federal House of Representatives. The
CDU also tried to repel Barry’s amendments, but their efforts were futile.
On the 23rd of January 2001, the Alliance for Change was formed, a coalition of
ten parties that formed the government in the Federation. The Alliance was centered
around the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the reformed Communist party of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.108 The SDP have always had overwhelmingly Bosniak members and voters,
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even though they claim to be a multiethnic party.109 They were joined by another major
Bosniak party, seven small Bosniak or Bosnian pro-unitary state parties and the New
Croatian Initiative (NCI), a minor Croat party. The NCI won a bit more than 1% of all
votes in the Federation and had only 2 deputies in the House of Representatives, in
contrast to the CDU’s 18% and 25 deputies.110 The CDU and a majority of Croats alike
felt that the new government is formed without parties that have a majority of Croat
support, and is not a legitimate government that can represent them. Clearly, almost 90%
of Croats and their votes were silenced, and the CDU’s response might seem like drastic,
but it was a desperate attempt to protect the political will of Croats in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
Disgruntled by Barry’s amendments, the closing of Erotel, the new government
that did not have legitimate Croat support and the situation in the Federation in general,
the Croatian National Assembly declared an inter-municipality council that consisted of
municipalities in the Federation with a Croat majority.111 They decided that on this
territory decisions by the new government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
would not be respected.112 On the 27th of March 2001 the president of CDU and the
newly elected Croat member of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Presidency, Ante Jelavić, called
on former members of the CDC, now into the joint Croat-Bosniak Federal Army units, to
cease their alliance to the Federal government and enter in the service of the Croatian
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National Assembly.113 Croatian Home Rule organized by CNA was quite effective and
there was nothing that politicians in Sarajevo or the Bosniak Cantons and municipalities
could do to prevent it without starting another war and inevitable bloodshed. Any military
engagement was out of the question.
Under international pressure, Home Rule was ceased on the 6th of October 2001,
marking a new era for Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an era in which they will lose
all of their political agency and equality with Bosniaks in the Federation. What really
brought down the Home Rule were actions by the High Representative and the Federal
government in Sarajevo that economically crippled the institutions running Home Rule.
While firing executive boards in public companies loyal to the Home Rule was one way
to cripple it, the straw that broke the camel’s back was the case of Hercegovačka Banka
(Herzegovinian Bank).
The Herzegovinian Bank ran more than one third of all transactions in the
Federation and it was largely a Croat bank closely associated with the CDU, and thus also
with Home Rule. On 6th of April 2001 SFOR units entered the bank and blew up the
safes, confiscating all the equipment and money.114 Tens of thousands of Croats lost their
life savings and a few thousand mostly Croat businesses also lost their capital.115 Croats
were shocked by this event, and it deepened the mistrust about the intentions of
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international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that remains today.116 Without
financial resources and backing provided through the bank, Home Rule crumbled. The
leader of the CDC and Home Rule, Ante Jelavić, who was the acting Croat member of
the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Presidency at the time, was dismissed from his function by
the High Representative in March 2001, despite being democratically elected and
receiving a majority of Croat votes in the past elections.117
Instead of Jelavić, Jozo Križanović, a member of the SDP, a Bosniak-dominated
party which received very few Croat votes, was elected as new Croat member of the
Presidency in the Parliament vote. He received only 6 out of 42 votes, and only two of
those votes were Croat votes.118 Jelavić was also banned from assuming public office or
any other political activity until 2009, and subsequently he moved to Croatia and is living
there now. Quite a few Croats were not only furious because of these decisions, they
were also disheartened by the failure of Home Rule, and since its failure, their political
position became increasingly worse every year. Croats have been politically marginalized
due to the decisions and amendments made by the High Representatives. These decisions
were often politically abused by Bosniaks in the Federation.
The High Representatives did not necessarily have malicious intentions toward
the Croats, nor are the Serbs and Bosniaks happy with all of their decisions. The OHR
decisions are primarily based on the assumption that if they reduce the political rights of
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the three Peoples and encourage the creation of an overarching Bosnian identity, the three
ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina may overcome their differences, leaving the
past behind and embracing Western-style multiculturalism in the process. The goal of
these policies was the establishment of a more centralized and stable Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Sadly, while this sounds good in theory, due to the political realities of
Bosnian-Herzegovinian political and social life, these decisions were often abused by the
more numerous Bosniaks in the Federation. Because of their numbers and the nature of
the amended electoral laws, Bosniaks usurped Croat political rights and positions in the
Federation. Hopefully, the OHR will soon realize that only through the decentralization,
federalization and true respect of collective political rights will progress be made in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The liberal-democracy unitary state model cannot work in a
multiethnic country such as Bosnia and Herzegovina.

An analysis of the amendments to the Federal Constitution
The Federal constitution between 1994 and 2008 was amended 109 times, and
around two thirds of those amendments were simply imposed by the OHR, while only
one third actually followed the regular procedure in the Federal Parliament.119 A lot of
those amendments eroded Croat political rights and eventually brought them into today’s
position in which they are second-class citizens. Today’s Constitution of the Federation is
almost unrecognizable in comparison to the original treaty signed in 1994 in Washington
which stopped the Croat-Bosniak conflict. It is unlikely that Croats would have ever
accepted Washington Treaty if they knew how much the Federal Constitution would be
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amended.120 For example, the original Washington Treaty, which includes the
Constitution of the Federation, also said that the Republic of Croatia and the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina may enter into confederation, which was done as a
compromise in order to compel Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croats into signing the treaty and
allow them to indirectly join Croatia through this confederation.121 However, this was
never realized, and some may feel that Croats were tricked into signing the Treaty with
this promise that international community never expected to be implemented.
Furthermore, adding Serbs as constituent Peoples in the Federation did not only
leave room for political games like Bosniaks getting elected as Serb representatives, but it
is also highly absurd.122 Serbs did not take any part in the creation of the Federation, and
Serb leadership was actually militarily engaged against the Federation until the Dayton
Agreement. The original Federation was supposed to be bigger (58% in contrast to
today’s 51%), and contained more Croat ethnic space in Northern Bosnia.123 The
amendments of the Federal constitution that really put Croats in an unequal position were
amendments between 2002 and 2006, including amendments mentioned in the previous
section.
Cantons were originally even more autonomous than they are today. They were
originally in charge of police, education, culture, taxes, energy, public services, land
policies and media, as well as most of legal matters.124 Some of these were gradually
transferred to the Federal level, and some Federal level authorities were transferred to the
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state level, thus creating more centralized Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, something that Croats and Serbs have always dreaded. For
example, even today there is an unconstitutional Ministry of Education on the Federal
level created by the OHR, even though the Constitutional Court decided that the
education is in the jurisdiction of Cantons, and in some cases of Croat municipalities in
Bosniak Cantons, even on the municipal level.125 Furthermore, foreign policy, defense
and customs were originally on entity level, but all of these were later transferred to the
state level.126 Again, this creates fear of further centralization of not only the whole
country, but also the Federation itself which might very easily become de facto Bosniak
entity instead of a Croat-Bosniak entity if the Cantons lose their original powers and
functions.
As explained earlier, the number of seats in the House of Representatives was
reduced, much against Croat wishes. The House of Peoples, the only way that Croats
could protect their national interests, is so changed that today Bosniaks can easily prevent
Croats from being able to use veto powers in the house by electing 6 out of 17 Croat
members, thus making the Federation a de facto Bosniak entity in which Croats cannot
wield any political power. In the most bizarre episode of modern Bosnian-Herzegovinian
history, in March 2011, the president of the Federation and his deputies were elected in
the House of Peoples, despite having only 5 votes from the Croat Club, even though the
constitution says that in order to elect the president and his deputies, at least one third of
members of each Club in the House of Peoples has to vote for them.127 This law is in
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place to prevent election of the president and deputies that do not have support of their
respective ethnic groups in the House of Peoples. Everyone with even the most
rudimentary math skills can easily calculate that at least one third of 17 is 6, not 5.
Croats complained to the Central Electoral Commission, which declared this
election unconstitutional. Nonetheless, for reasons known only to him, High
Representative Inzko simply decided to suspend this decision, and allowed the formation
of the Federal government in 2011 which not only lacked Croat support and legitimacy,
but was also unconstitutional.128 In reaction, Croats started using “5≠17/3” as a sign of
protest against the High Representative Inzko and the illegitimate Federal government,
showing their distain by putting signs with this mathematical expression around Mostar
on the 25th of November 2013, the official Bosnian-Herzegovinian Statehood Day, which
is often not celebrated by Croats.129
Originally, the Federal government had 11 ministries, 4 ministers without
portfolios, a president of the Federation and his deputy, who was also a minister, and who
had to be Croat if president was Bosniak, and vice versa.130 Bosniaks had 7 ministries and
3 ministries without portfolio, while Croats were allocated 5 ministries and 1 ministry
without portfolio. Also, every minister had a deputy who was from a different ethnic
group, keeping them in check and preventing them from making decisions that might be
malicious towards other ethnic groups. This changed through the amendments because
Serbs were now also constituent People in the Federation. Now, Federal government had
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16 regular ministries, 8 of which are allocated to the Bosniaks, 5 to the Croats and 3 to
the Serbs. Also, deputy minister positions ceased to exist. This was bad for Croats, who
cannot check decisions by more numerous Bosniak ministers.131 Furthermore, while
decisions were previously made by a consensus that involved both Croats and Bosniaks,
after the amendments by the OHR, the government only needs one half of all ministers to
vote in order to pass a decision. In practice this means that Bosniaks can pass decisions
even if the Croat and Serb ministers do not agree with them.132 Also, Serb ministers are
often elected from Bosniak and pro-Bosniak parties, further intensifying Bosniak power
in the executive branch of Federal government in the process.
Even more worrisome is the fact that even the Constitutional Court is not immune
to these political games and the outvoting that came into existence due to amendments
put forward by the OHR. Judges on the Federal constitutional court are elected by a
simple majority in the House of Peoples, which means that Croat judges can be elected
without any support from major Croat parties, due to the fact that Bosniak parties do not
only control the Bosniak Club, but also quite often Serb and Others Clubs, giving them a
vast majority in this house.133 Also, the Federal constitutional court now, after
amendments, has nine members, and it needs five votes to accept or decline a motion.
The amended constitution says that out of nine judges, at least two shall be Croat, Serb
and Bosniak, and one “Other”. This means that it is possible to have four Bosniak judges,
which can with one Other judge, who is usually elected by Bosniaks in the parliament,
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form majority (five out of nine) in the constitutional court.134 This means that Croat
political will and interests can not only be ignored in legislative and executive branches
of the Federal government, but also in juridical branch as well, which is especially
worrying. Also, it is important to note that out of 34 judges of the Supreme Court in
March 2012, only three of them were actually Croat, again putting Croat interests in
danger.135
Moreover, it is strange that all the positions in public institutions, which have
ethnic quotas and reserve spots for ethnic groups, are actually set according to the census
from 1991. Taking into consideration how drastically the ethnic map of Bosnia and
Herzegovina has changed because of the war, it leaves us with “Croat officials” being
elected from places where Croats were ethnically cleansed during the war and where they
did not return in great numbers.136 Furthermore, two “mixed cantons” enjoyed special
rights and laws, with the aim of protecting both Croats and Bosniaks in these cantons
from being dominated by the other group. Through amendments, these special statuses
were revoked, which is worrying because of the bad position of Croats in the Central
Bosnia Canton, where the ratio used to be almost 1:1 between Croats and Bosniaks, but
today is closer to 1:1.5, thanks to the fact that many Croats could not return or chose not
to return to their homes after the war.137
Finally, on the Federal level, Mostar, the city with the highest number of Croats
and their cultural and academic center in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has a special status
that was imposed by the OHR. Its electoral law divides Mostar into 7 districts, 3 on the
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“Croat side”, 3 on the “Bosniak side” and one in the center that cannot directly elect
representatives at all. All of the 6 neighborhoods elect 3 representatives each, despite the
fact that one of them on the Croat (Western) side of the city has four times as many
people as one of the neighborhoods on the Bosniak (Eastern) side of the city.138 This is
especially puzzling because Travnik, the seat of the other mixed Canton, which was also
a significant site of Croat-Bosniak War, does not have this special status.139 It is not hard
to figure out why Croats are dissatisfied with such a position of Mostar, which they treat
as their capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and which has a Croat majority today.
Therefore, the political position of Croats in the Federation is almost unbearable
after all the amendments, especially the ones between 2002 and 2006. Still, the Croat
positon on the state level is not so bad, and they are relatively equal with the other two
ethnic groups, except for the electoral laws for Presidency that were already abused twice
by Bosniak voters and politicians, which is the topic of my next section. The only other
problem at the state level is the fact that originally Bosnia and Herzegovina was way less
centralized. Today, Bosniaks (who will probably soon make up more than 50% of the
total population) are calling for more centralized Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such
centralized Bosnia and Herzegovina could then be dominated by Bosniak political power
through their sheer number. For example, according to research conducted in 2010, more
than 80% of Bosniaks support a centralized state without any cantons or entities.140 In
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contrast, 70% of Croats support three entities solution, while 80% of Serbs support
secession of Republika Srpska and a merger between this entity and Serbia.141
The Dayton Peace Agreement was amended only once, and all the additional
powers that the state level assumed from the entities did not come through constitutional
reforms, but rather through decisions of the OHR.142 This puts Bosnia and Herzegovina
in a weird position where the present state structure is unconstitutional, one example
including having a defense ministry and state army rather than entity armies as it is
written in the Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement.143 Still, the real problem for
Croats lies within the Federation, because this is the level of administrative division in
which they lost their entire political agency, while they lost only some minor ones on the
state level.
When one looks back at the original Washington agreement on which Croats
agreed, and the present state of the Federation, the difference is staggering. It is probable
that Croats, if they knew what would happen to the Federation over time due to the OHR
amendments and decisions, would have never signed the Washington Treaty and would
rather take chance with the war they were losing then effectively signing away their
freedoms and rights. The period between 2002 and 2006 elections was, except for these
amendments, rather uneventful and Croats did not attempt to stage another Home Rule,
also due to the fact that their legitimate parties were part of the government during this
period. The true agony for Croats started with the 2006 elections, when for the first time
voting rights were so misused that Bosniaks managed to elect both Bosniak and Croat
141
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members of the tripartite Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The same thing also
happened in 2010, when Bosniak parties also usurped all the power on the Federal level,
and something similar was attempted in 2014, but did not succeed due to the reasons that
I will explain later on in this paper.

The phenomenon of Željko Komšić
The elections in 2006, held on the 1st of October, were marked by a controversy
that is still often discussed, and which showed that Croats lack proper laws and
protections that would allow them to elect their own representatives. On this day Željko
Komšić was elected as a Crotian member of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Presidency, which is
made up from three members: one representative of Croats elected in the Federation, one
representative of Bosniaks also elected in the Federation, and one representative of Serbs
elected in Republika Srpska. Komšić, who is an ethnic Croat from Sarajevo and who is a
highly decorated ABH soldier, was nominated by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in
his presidential bid. The Social Democratic Party, as already noted, is a reformed
Bosnian-Herzegovinian Communist Party from the Yugoslavian era, and as such, by its
definition it is a left-leaning party, in contrast to most other parties in Bosnia and
Herzegovina which are center-right and right parties. Still, even though SDP is a
nominally multiethnic “Bosnian party,”144 its members and voters are largely Bosniaks.
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In his analysis of 2010 general elections, sociologist Ivan Vukoja estimated that
SDP has support of some 1.5% of Serb voters, 2.5% of Croat voters, and a staggering
27.5% of Bosniak voters in Bosnia and Herzegovina.145 This shows that even though
SDP promotes the ideas of a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina without ethnic divisions
and claim that they are not a Bosniak party, close to 90% of their voters are Bosniaks and
they do not enjoy much support from the other two groups. Such a unitary state that SDP
propose would function as a typical democracy in most Europeans national states, and
because of it, Croats and Serbs are afraid that the more numerous Bosniaks would
outvote them and elect their own representatives, as it happened with Komšić in 2006 and
2010. Vukoja also claims that the unitary state policy of the SDP is just a Bosniak
nationalistic policy of a unitary state that would dominate disguised as a pro-Bosnian and
liberal option that overlooks ethnic divisions.146
In the 2002 elections, Croat member of the Presidency Dragan Čović got close to
115,000 votes, or almost 62% of all “Croat” votes in Bosnia and Herzegovina out of
some 187,000 votes casted for Croat members of the Presidency.147 In 2006 Komšić
received just over 116,000 votes, or just under 40% of all votes for Croat member of the
Presidency.148 The CDU’s candidate won 77,000 and a candidate of the CDU 1990, a
splinter faction of CDU that was formed earlier in 2006 as an independent party, won
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over 53,000 votes.149 Together with other candidates, over 293,000 voters voted for Croat
member of the Presidency. This is some 106,000 more votes than only four years ago,
which raised quite a few questions of where these votes came from.
It is important to note that other Croat candidates won in all the municipalities
with a Croat majority, while Komšić won the majority of votes in only two
municipalities.150 One of them is the mostly Serb municipality in Western Bosnia which
has around 3,000 people, and the other one is Gračanica, a largely Bosniak-populated
municipality in North Bosnia. This municipality, which has around 50,000 people, almost
all of them Bosniaks, had only 132 Croats, or less than 0.3% in 1991 (and probably even
less today).151 When we take this in consideration, it quickly becomes obvious that
Komšić got a majority of his votes from Bosniak voters rather than Croats, despite him
being elected as a Croat member of the Presidency. Quite ironically, some western
journalists, who are not familiar enough with the complex political situation in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, celebrated Komšić’s victory as a hope for post-ethnic Bosnia and
Herzegovina, overlooking the fact that the Croat right to elect their member of the
Presidency was usurped by more numerous Bosniaks.152
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The electoral manipulation was even more obvious in the 2010 elections, held on
the 3rd of October. Running again to be a Croat member of the Presidency, Komšić won
staggering 337,000 votes, or 60% of all votes cast for the post.153 The CDU candidate
Borjana Krišto won 110,000 votes, and other Croat candidates had another 110,000 votes
cast for them.154 This means that more than 557,000 voters in the Federation voted for
Croat members of the Presidency. In contrast, all Bosniak candidates won around
466,000 votes, or some 90,000 votes less than Croat candidates.155 Bearing in mind that
Bosniaks are almost four times as numerous as Croats in the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, it is obvious that those 557,000 votes cast for Croat candidates could not all
come from Croat voters. Moreover, even by most generous estimations, it is estimated
that there are around 450,000 to 500,000 Croats in the Federation.156 This means that
even if all eligible Croats voted (doubtful, as the number of Croat voters in the Federation
is usually between 180,000 and 220,000), there is still a question of where the other
200,000 votes came from. This question can be easily answered by examining the
municipalities from which Željko Komšić got most of his votes.
Komšić did not win most votes in any municipality in the Federation which has a
Croat majority, while it got the majority of all votes cast in a vast majority of
municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina that have Bosniak majority.157 For example, in
Kalesija, a municipality of some 35,000 people, Komšić won over 7,000 votes. At the
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same time, other Croat candidates together won 33 votes.158 It is estimated that between
93% and 99% of Kalesija’s population are Bosniaks, and they were only 35 Croats in
Kalesija in 1991 (or less than 0.1%).159 Just looking at this municipality and taking the
above information into consideration, it is obvious that Komšić won thanks to Bosniak
votes. It is estimated that out of 337,000 of votes that Komšić got in 2010 elections,
Croats gave him some 4,500 votes, or just over 1.3% of all votes he received.160 When we
take into consideration that this means that he got support of only 2.3% of all Croat
voters, it becomes obvious that he was elected without support of Croats in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and thus lacks legitimacy to represent Croats in the Presidency, despite
being legally elected according to the current electoral laws.161 Actually, Komšić has
almost become a symbol of inequality and the lack of political power for Croats in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
It is important to note that Komšić is not the only Croat representative elected
without Croat votes or support. In Republika Srpska, which has a Serb entity president
and Croat and Bosniak vice-presidents, in 2010 Emil Vlajki was elected as a Croat vicepresident with 6,000 votes, most of them non-Croat voters.162 This was some 500 more
than the next Croat candidate and Vlajki became vice-president of Republika Srpska,
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despite not having Croat legitimacy and not being elected by Croats. Still, this was only
on the entity level rather than state level, and the case of Željko Komšić is more
important than that of Vlajki, because 95% of Croats live in the Federation where Croat
and Bosniak members of the Presidency for the state level are being elected.163 Moreover,
even Bosniak diplomats like Mr. Arifhodžić represent themselves as Croats in order to
get diplomatic positions reserved for Croats, as one third of all diplomatic posts are
reserved for Croats, showing how easy it is to manipulate the system and usurp Croats
rights.164
The problem of Komšić’s election was not only in the fact that he got elected
without Croat support, but also in the way that questions about legality and the legitimacy
of Komšić’s election were discussed in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian academic community.
For example, Eldar Sarajlić, a respected Bosnian--Herzegovinian political scientists and
philosopher, has argued that the election of Mr. Komšić can be seen as a positive trend,
because he was elected by Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizens who reject ethnic divisions,
and he is not the only one who supports such an argument.165 I find this argument to be
either naïve or very cynical, because of the very nature and history of Bosnia and
Herzegovina as a multi-ethnic country. Sarajlić argues that it is everyone’s right to decide
what ethnicity they are, and that no one has the right to tell to the Komšić’s voters that
they cannot constitute the Croat ethnic group in Bosnia and Herzegovina.166
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I find Sarajlić’s argument to be the prime example of demagogy that occurs when
such a complicated political matter as the election of Komšić is abstracted to the
theoretical level, without taking into consideration the political realities of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and its turbulent past. While I do think that everyone should have the right
to self-identify themselves, this liberal right can easily be turned into a political weapon
that denies certain ethnic groups political rights and freedom to choose their
representatives in multi-ethnic countries. The best example of this would be the elections
of Željko Komšić as the Croat member of the Presidency without Croat support. In
practice, that is a clear usurpation of power for political ends, and not any exercise in
self-identification and liberalism. If Komšić, as a candidate for the Croat member of the
Presidency, got less than 5,000 Croat votes, in contrast with the other candidate that got
110,000 Croat votes, then he clearly does not have the support of Croats in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. It is very unlikely that those Bosniak voters who voted for Komšić, and a
number of whom, ironically, probably fought Croats as members of ABH during the war,
declared themselves ethnically Croat and their native language as Croatian on the 2013
census. After all, even Komšić, who is supposed to represent Croats, officially said that
his native language is Bosnian (which is spoken by Bosniaks) rather than Croatian.167
Another Bosnian-Herzegovinian academic, Asim Mujkić, argues that the one
man, one vote principle of the SDP’s proposed unitary Bosnian-Herzegovinian state is
the most democratic principle, because it would allow people to vote also based on their
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associations to other groups (such as class), rather than just their ethnic group.168 This
principle of a liberal democratic state, which is often the case in European national states,
works well on an abstract level (as does Komšić’s election), but is just candy-coated
Bosniak nationalism once we project it onto political realities. The war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina during 1990s was fought between three ethnic groups who tried to establish
and dominate “their” ethnic areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina (often expanded and
consolidated through ethnic cleansing by all three sides), and not between higher and
lower classes or supporters of one football club over another. Therefore, it is ridiculous to
say that belonging to a specific class or other group can be more important to a majority
of people in the political reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina than the ethnicity of
politicians and their voters. Thus, the election of Komšić was clearly an electoral
manipulation of existing laws and very harmful for political rights of Croats in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.

Why the election of “Komšić Mark 2” failed
Because the law limits members of the Presidency to only two terms, Komšić
could not run again in the 2014 elections held on October 12. In 2013 Komšić founded
Democratic Front (DF), social democratic party which is a splinter party of the SDP.
Soon, many members of the SDP left the SDP for the DF. Only four candidates were
nominated for Croat member of the Presidency: Dragan Čović, leader of the CDU of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croat member of the Presidency between 2002 and 2006,
Martin Raguž, leader of the CDU 1990, and two minor candidates, one from a minor
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Croat/Bosnian party and another one nominated by Komšić’s DF. The DF also nominated
a candidate for Bosniak president, and they were the only party that had more than one
candidate, while all the other parties supported just one.169 Čović, who was supported by
the CDU and some minor Croat parties, won 128,000 votes, and Raguž nominated by the
CDU 1990 almost won 95,000 votes, while two other candidates won 15,000 and 7,000
votes respectively.170 This means that there were 245,000 votes cast for the Croat
member of the Presidency, less than half of the votes cast in the 2010 elections, which
also points that Komšić was elected by Bosniak votes. At the same time all Bosniak
candidates won some 753,000 votes, way more than in 2010.
While the DF’s candidate for the Croat member of the Presidency obviously won
only 7,000 votes, their candidate for the Bosniak member of the Presidency won 114,000
votes and was not elected. There were still electoral manipulations on part of the
Bosniaks that wanted to prevent Čović, who is an advocate of the further federalization of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, from getting elected. Martin Raguž, leader of the CDU 1990, a
party which since its formation in 2006 was seen as a center-right alternative party for
Croat voters disappointed in the inefficient CDU which failed to improve the political
position of Croats in the Federation, changed his rhetoric a few months before the
elections. His rhetoric became less Croat centre-right rhetoric and closer to the rhetoric of
Bosniak parties, in contrast to the somewhat hard-liner rhetoric by the CDU and Čović.171
No wonder that he was seen as less of two evils to many voters that dread Čović’s calls
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for the formation of a third entity with a Croat majority. Even during his campaign,
Bosniak First Bosnian-Herzegovinian Party leader Šeherezada Delić promised that her
20,000 members will vote for Raguž on the next elections, despite members of her party
being almost all Bosniaks.172
Even though Raguž lost and Čović was elected Croat member of the Presidency,
Bosniak votes that Raguž received show that just due to mere chance and fragmentation
on Bosniak political scene (record ten candidates ran for Bosniak member of the
Presidency) Croats managed to actually elect their legitimate candidate into the office
that was usurped for eight years. An analysis performed by the Institute for Political and
Social Research from Mostar showed that around 52% of Raguž’s votes, or over 49,000
votes, were cast by Bosniaks rather than Croats.173 For example, Raguž received roughly
three times less votes in three Croat cantons and in Croat municipalities in the two mixed
cantons than Čović.174 On the other hand, in Bosniak cantons, Raguž won three times as
many votes as Čović, and also eight times as many votes as his party (CDU 1990), which
brings us to the conclusion that at least 50% of all his votes were casted by Bosniaks
rather than Croats.175 For example, in Bosnia-Podrinje Canton, where there are less than
one hundred Croats, Čović won 43 votes, while Raguž won 564 votes. At the same time
Raguž’s party CDU 1990 won only one vote in this Canton. This means that Raguž
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received 564 times as many votes as his party, which point to the abuses of the electoral
laws by the Bosniaks.176
It was only due to pure luck that Bosniak candidates for Presidency were more
numerous than ever (making Bosniak voter body more fragmented in the process) that
this time Croats managed to elect their own legitimate representative for the Presidency.
Also, the Croat vice-President of Republika Srpska was actually elected by Croat votes,
denying Emil Vlajki another term of usurping the Croat position.177 Still, it is evident that
the election law has to be changed, because on the next elections Bosniaks might again
choose Croat member of the Presidency.

The unconstitutional usurpation of Croat political positions in the Federation
In 2010 elections the CDU got 112,000 votes in the Federation, while the CDU
1990 coalition, which included the right-wing Croatian Party of Rights, won 50,000
votes.178 The People’s Party for Work and Betterment, a party run by the Croat tycoon
Lijanović family which received quite a few Bosniak votes, got 49,000 votes.179 As
mentioned earlier, the SDP and the Party for Democratic Action, together with two minor
Croat parties, the Croatian Party of Rights and the People’s Party for Work and
Betterment created a coalition on the Federal level, the so-called “Platform.” The CDU
and the CDU 1990 were not part of this government that was formed in March 2011,
even though it is estimated that they won more than 85% of Croat votes in the
176
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Federation.180 The government was formed despite the fact that they needed one third
support in the Croat Club in the Federal House of Peoples.
This coalition had only five votes out of 17 Croats in the House of Peoples, all of
them elected in Bosniak cantons by Bosniak votes. Still, according to the constitution
they needed six votes, and the Central Electoral Committee proclaimed the new
government illegal. This decision was suspended by High Representative Valentin Inzko,
who said that they had enough votes, because apparently five is one third of 17, and in
this surreal episode of Bosnian-Herzegovinian political history, as noted earlier, allowed
usurpation of Croat political rights not only in the Presidency, but also on the Federal
level. Because of the fact that the Federal government was formed without parties that
had Croat support, much like in 2001, the CDU and the CDU 1990 said that they would
not accept any decisions made by this government, which was thus crippled from the
start.181
It is interesting to note that in the state parliament, both the CDU and the CDU
1990 were part of the majority coalition. This fact points out the fact that the real problem
for Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not the state constitution, but the heavily
amended Federal constitution. This is especially evident when taking into consideration
that the state level has relatively few powers in comparison to entities, and 95% of Croats
live in the Federation, the bigger out of two entities. As a response to the formation of the
Federal government without Croat parties, the CDU and the CDU 1990, together with
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some other minor Croat parties, revived the Croatian National Assembly (CNA) in April
2011, in what some journalists described as a bomb that can potentially explode and
destroy Bosnia and Herzegovina.182 Still, this time, Home Rule was not proclaimed, but
rather the CNA is trying to reform Bosnia and Herzegovina and secure an entity for
Croats through legal means. The formation of the CNA raised some anxieties about its
aims, because the memories of Home Rule are still fresh.
In 2014 all the pfarties of the CNA, except for the CDU 1990, jointly formed a list
for elections, centered around the CDU and its candidates.183 As already mentioned, the
CNA/CDU candidate Čović became the new Croat member of the Presidency in the 2014
elections held on the 12th of October. The CNA list won majority votes in every single
municipality with a Croat majority, having support mirroring the support that CDU
enjoyed in the early 1990s.184 In the state parliament they have four representatives in
both the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples, while the only other Croat
party, the CDU 1990 has only one representative in both houses respectively. 185 Also, on
the Federal level the CDU as leader of the CNA coalition won 13 seats in the Federal
House of Representatives, and 13 seats in the House of Peoples. In contrast, the CDU
1990 has 4 and 1 seats, respectively, while the other three Croat seats in the House of
Peoples are from non-Croat parties.186
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This means that any future Federal government cannot be formed without
CDU/CNA support, because this time not even High Representative Inzko could make a
claim that three or four is one third of 17. Therefore, there were vigorous negotiations
between the CDU, the Party for Democratic Action (PDA) and the DF in forming the
Federal government, and the government formed on 31st of March, but due to the
ideological differences of these parties will have problems remaining functional.187 The
CDU calls for the entity or federal unit with a Croat majority, while the PDA and the DF
are against it and they want to create either a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina, or preserve
the current status quo. Bakir Izetbegović, the son of Alija Izetbegović and leader of the
PDA has said that he would not allow a Croat federal unit nor even a TV channel in the
Croatian language, because according to him, that would be further division of an
(already divided) country based on ethnic borders.188 And while other multiethnic
European countries, such as Belgium or Switzerland, have found solutions to protect all
ethnic groups and give them equal rights, the “Croat issue” still troubles Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
The CDU leader and CNA president Čović said on the 28th of February 2015
during the latest session of CNA that further federalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina is
the only way out of the political crisis and the only path that would ensure Croats that
their political will not be violated in the future.189 Croats are very unsatisfied with the
current situation and rightfully so. During two weeks of February of 2011, more than
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140,000 Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina signed a petition against the political
marginalization of Croats, and asked for their political rights to be respected.190 They are
not only unsatisfied with the political situation, but also with the economic one, which is
a byproduct of the way taxes work in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which I will analyze in
the next section.
Even the European Parliament discouraged the unitary tendencies of some
Bosniak and pro-Bosnian politicians, and called for equality of Croats in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.191 European Parliament members from Croatia actively drew attention to
the problems that Croats face in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and one possible solution is the
further federalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina which would give Croats their own
federal unit, making sure that they can elect their own representatives.192 Quite simply,
the present situation in the Federation is not sustainable much longer, both economically
and politically, and a new solution must be found soon. For example, the Federal minister
of War Veterans in the last government was a Bosniak politician closely associated with
the people that ethnically cleansed Croats from Bugojno and which run some of the 331
concentration camps for Croats that were present in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the
war.193 Recently, the CDU delegate in the Bugojno municipal council was verbally
attacked by a Bosniak member of the council, a cousin of the Federal minister Helez, and
he was threatened that Croats would be again slaughtered in Bugojno, as they were
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during the war.194 This one episode just shows the type of problems Croats face in the
Federation today, and why a reform is necessary if they want to enjoy the same rights as
Bosniaks and Serbs.
Another problem with the current system is the fact that it is highly complicated,
illogical and overly expensive and bureaucratic. For example, in the last elections only 13
Serbs were initially elected into the Federal House of Peoples, instead of the required 17,
because there were simply not enough Serbs in cantonal assemblies.195 Another example
that shows all the complexity and expensiveness of the current Bosnian-Herzegovinian
political apparatus is the fact that there are 13 prime ministers in the country (10 cantons,
2 entities and state level), and in total 569 members of various parliaments and
governments, and this is only in the Federation and Cantons, without counting the state
level, Republika Srpska and Brčko District.196 For a country of barely 3.7 million people,
all these officials plus their deputies, secretaries, drivers and other staff is simply too
much of a burden to carry, especially in a country where unemployment is close to
44%.197 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and especially the overcomplicated Federation, is
simply too bureaucratic and expensive to be sustainable without substantial foreign aid.
This becomes even more evident once we start to look at taxes and the way they are
distributed, which is another reason why Croats want reforms of the Federation or their
own entity.
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Taxes, census, demonstrations and the current state
Two entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina function like mini-countries; the unitary
Republika Srpska and the complex Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Taxes in the
Federation, and the way they are run create a lot of anti-Sarajevo (the Federation’s
capital) sentiment, not only in Croat cantons, but also in some Bosniak cantons, which
call for a fairer system and less centralization.198 In only eight years between 2006 and
2013, the Sarajevo Canton received 1.2 billion Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible
Marks more than it paid through Federal indirect taxes. From all the tax revenues that the
Federation collects, 36.2% is used to finance Federal institutions, 51.48% is used to
finance Cantons, 8.42% is used to finance municipalities and 3.9% is used to finance
roads.199 Those 51.48% for financing cantons is then divided, from a joint account, and
sent to every canton. The amount that they receive is based on the population, number of
elementary and high school students, and to a less extent, area of the canton in km2. This
number is then multiplied by the coefficient, which is normally one, except for the two
poorest (Croat) cantons where the coefficient is 1.1 and 1.5, and the smallest Bosniak
canton with the coefficient 1.8, in order to offset underdevelopment of these cantons.
Sarajevo’s coefficient is 2 because of its Federal capital status, which when
translated into revenues means that Sarajevo receives 30% of all Federal tax income
revenues for Cantons. This means that Sarajevo and Bosnia-Podrinje cantons receive
roughly double the tax revenues per capita than other cantons. The Institute for Social
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and Political research has calculated that just in the last eight years, through this tax
system, Croat cantons have lost 120.9 million Marks, and two mixed cantons have lost
336.9 million Marks, which means that Croats paid roughly 300 million Marks in taxes
then were than given for the development of predominately Bosniak Sarajevo.200 If
Croats had their own political unit in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they could be reassured
that their taxes are used for development of Croat municipalities, rather than redirected
towards Sarajevo.
Still, the borders of such units are not easily determined in Central Bosnia, but
they can be, once the ethnic breakdown of results of the 2013 census, the first official
census after 1991, is published in June 2015.201 Still, there are genuine fears that more
people were recorded than actually live in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for political purposes
and manipulation. Even so, the number of 3.7 million is likely to decrease close to more
realistic 3.4 million through additional checks, and this census will finally give us
important information about the Bosnian-Herzegovinian population and changes in ethnic
structure and distribution that resulted from the war. Likely, the census will show that
most municipalities have a 80+% majority of one of the three ethnic groups, and that few
mixed municipalities are actually divided between Croat and Bosniak parts. Nonetheless,
the census and its results will be important tools in determining possible reforms in the
internal structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Hopefully, the census results and the fact that neither Federal nor state
government can be formed without Croats this time should be used as a basis for
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territorial reorganization, whose proposals I will tackle in the next section. Only once the
political situation is solved and all three ethnic groups have equal rights, as well as
national minorities, it will be possible to tackle the economic and social problems that
plague Bosnia and Herzegovina. As I wrote in my column, poverty, emigration and
radicalization of certain Islamic elements in Bosnia and Herzegovina are plaguing the
country.202 Unemployment is at 44%, even though it is likely that the real number is over
50%, and young and educated people are leaving the country. Just in 2014 68,000 people
emigrated from Bosnia and Herzegovina, a staggering 2%, and this trend is likely to
continue, especially amongst Croats who have Croatian passports and can freely travel
across the EU.203 Finally, it is estimated that a few hundred young radical Wahhabi
fighters have left Bosnia and Herzegovina for Iraq and Syria, and the real danger is in
possible attacks that these people might commit in Bosnia and Herzegovina once they
come back, thus raising already high ethnic tensions. In order for Bosnian-Herzegovinian
society to effectively tackle these issues, first there have to be political changes that
would give Croats equal rights and return their fate in the future of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Otherwise, Bosnia and Herzegovina might face social unrests that can
easily spiral into ethnic conflict, as almost happened in February 2014.
In February 2014, spontaneous protests in larger Bosniak towns and cities, like
Tuzla and Sarajevo, nearly grew into social movements that demanded changes in
government and better living opportunities. The protesters clashed with police in multiple
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towns, and even burned Cantonal government buildings in Mostar and Tuzla. They also,
sadly, burned down a section of the Presidency building in Sarajevo together with the
official Archive of Bosnia and Herzegovina, destroying thousands of historical
documents in the process.204 This is so called the “Bosnian Spring”, which did not really
catch on in Serb and Croat parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite all three sides being
similarly impoverished. What was worrying is that many protesters in Bosniak towns in
the Federation called for the abolition of Cantons, justifying it with saving money on the
administration and organizing the Federation and then all of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a
centralized liberal democracy.205 The fear of many Croats voiced in the media is that the
protests, which started as social unrest due to poverty, are turning into political protests
that aim to abolish Cantons, the only level of three main levels of government in Bosnia
and Herzegovina where Croats can still freely elect their representatives without fear of
someone manipulating elections or outvoting them. This really showed that although a
liberal unitary post-ethnic state sounds very appealing as an idea, in reality, it would just
further diminish Croat, and also consequently Serb, rights. Given political realities of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, this idea is far from liberal, it is very close to the rightist
Bosniak nationalist rhetoric from the 1990s, disguised under quasi-liberal rhetoric.
In the research conducted in November 2013 on 1,200 people, political scientist
and PR expert Božo Skoko found out some interesting information about what ethnic
groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina think of each other. For example, almost one third of
Bosniaks think that Bosnia and Herzegovina is, or rather should be, a Bosniak national
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state.206 Also, some 73% of people said that the consequences of war like ethnic tensions
are still present in Bosnian-Herzegovinian society, which is worrying information.207
Still, not everything is so grim. 84% of people think that it is the time for reconciliation,
which gives hope that Bosnia and Herzegovina can function as a normal state led by its
own politicians without the High Representative with dictatorial powers.208 The only
question is what this new Bosnia and Herzegovina should look like. More than 70% of
Bosniaks and Croats would like to change the illogical Dayton constitution (78% and
71% respectively, and although for almost completely different reasons), only 27% of
Serbs are willing to do so, because they are quite satisfied with the rights they have in
Republika Srpska.209 Finally, it was very surprising that 60% of people were in favor of
the three entities solution which would give one Federal unit to each ethnic group in the
new, Federal Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially when we compare these results with the
2010 research mentioned earlier.210 It is interesting to see that 77% of Serbs like this idea,
even more than Croats (69%), who would benefit the most from this solution. Even
Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik stated on multiple occasions that Croats have to
get their own entity made of Croat territory in the Federation in order to solve the “Croat
issue”, thus creating an unlikely alliance between Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croats and
Bosnian-Herzegovinian Serbs. 211 Still, only 37% of Bosniaks are in favor of this idea,
which is still an all-time high number.
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As the largest ethnic group and the ethnic group that is most concerned about the
survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a united country, Bosniak politicians should look
more into possible solutions to the “Croat issue” and other political issues plaguing the
country, if Bosnia and Herzegovina is to survive in the long run. Otherwise, Republika
Srpska might secede, followed by Croat parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, leaving the
Bosniak parts surrounded by somewhat hostile Serbian and Croatian states. This is the
worst possible scenario for Bosniaks. None of the possible solutions is perfect, but as
always, there are bad, terrible and even worse solutions, and all three ethnic groups in
Bosnia and Herzegovina should agree on the most feasible solution, which in my opinion
is the three federal units (entities) solution. Finally, it is important to note that the lack of
understanding in the west, especially in the US, about the political realities of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and the problems that Croats face today is disturbing. I truly hope that this
paper will shed some light on these problems, because it is unbelievable that in the
analysis for the US senate about current issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina the case of
Komšić and usurpation of Croat positions are not even mentioned. 212

Possible solutions:
A unitary state
A unitary state, organized like many European national states, would dissolve the
special rights of the three ethnic groups and solve the problems of national minorities
unable to be elected in the Presidency at the moment. Moreover, it is believed that such a
state would be more functional, and with reduced administration, more economical and
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sustainable.213 Even though such a solution, which would put everyone in the “equal legal
position” seems like a good idea, it could never work in practice. This solution is
advocated by pro-Bosnian parties and some Westerners probably far removed from
Bosnian-Herzegovinian realities. Almost all Croats and Serbs are against it, and it is very
likely that they would blockade such a solution in the parliament, and even rise in
rebellion if needed. Quite simply, a unitary state could never be achieved, unless Croats
and Serbs are militarily defeated in detail by Bosniaks in another war which cannot
happen today. Croats and Serbs fear that they would be dominated by more numerous
Bosniaks in a unitary state, and therefore such a solution could not be sustainable in the
long run.
The drawback is that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a highly complicated multinational state with a bloody history, and a liberal unitary state is just not a feasible
solution. Such a state, even if established, would soon find itself embroiled in civil war,
or at least in civil disobedience and uprisings by Croats and Serbs. Moreover, a unitary
state would not solve the “Croat issue” and their marginalization, but would further
marginalize them, removing the protection and political power that they have at Cantonal
levels. The centralized state, dreamed of some Bosniaks, is even warned against by the
EU,214 and it is the one out of my seven possible solutions that is most likely to fail.
Simply, Republika Srpska would veto any effort to reorganize Bosnia and Herzegovina in
such way that it would completely erase the stipulations of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
Any serious discussion about this solution is pointless, because it would fail in reality
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despite sounding achievable in theory. Therefore, this solution should be scratched off the
table, and any pursuit of such goals may only result in further divisions and separatist
sentiment from Croats and Serbs as a counter to such tendencies.
Regionalization
A “regions solutions” is an interesting proposal that is simply a modified “unitary
state” model. Because of this association it suffers from many dangers and drawbacks
that the previous solution also suffers from. This model, advocated by most pro-Bosnian
and Bosniak parties, but also some Croat parties, would reorganize the country into
regions.215 Bosnia and Herzegovina would be more centralized, and the Federation and
Republika Srpska would be dissolved. The new state would have a number of multiethnic
regions which would not be absolutely dominated by either ethnic group. Politicians
suggesting this solution hope that it would bring the end to ethnic divisions, and
suddenly, being a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina will become more important than
being a Serb, Croat or Bosniak. Again, in theory, this proposal seems like a good one.
The country would have four to five multiethnic regions, which would speed up regional
development. Also, a simple structure of municipality-region-state would save a lot of
resources in comparison with today’s gigantic bureaucratic apparatus. 216 Also, the
premise is that if there are no ethnic cantons and entities, people are more likely to put
past grievances aside and just identify as Bosnians and Herzegovinians.
The main drawback of this proposal is that again, there is a fear of
marginalization of non-Bosniaks because Bosniaks make almost 50% of population and
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they could easily form government in the parliament without Croat and Serb parties,
something that happened twice in the Federation already. Republika Srpska and its
representatives would never allow such change, because the war was stopped only after
limited independence within Bosnia and Herzegovina was guaranteed to the Serbs in the
form of Republika Srpska. It is not likely that they would give these freedoms and rights
away twenty years after the war, especially because tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina
are as high as ever. Moreover, this model would not secure Croats their political rights
and no one could guarantee Croats that they would be able to elect their legitimate
representatives. Furthermore, future regions even if they would not have absolute
majority (two thirds of population) of any ethnic group, would still have the relative
majority of one ethnic group in every of them. This would create political competition of
ethnic groups for power in these regions, and possibly result in civil disobedience and
even rebellions by the relative minorities in these regions. We should not forget that
almost every single city, town and village in Bosnia and Herzegovina is dominated by
one ethnic group and ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina are always trying to
preserve their self-interest over other groups. Finally, it would be very hard to establish
these regions and to define not only their borders, but also their powers. Therefore, even
if by some miracle there is a reorganization of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbs are
bypassed in it, the regionalization would not be functional. Even if it is not as bad as an
“unitary state”, in the end Bosnia and Herzegovina would end up as a centralized state
dominated by Bosniaks, something that Croats and Serbs could never let happen without
going to war.

72

Cantons
Cantonization of whole Bosnia and Herzegovina is a good compromise solution,
but it is very unlikely that it would be ever accepted by Serb politicians, and depending
on the nature of cantonization, also by Bosniak politicians. The goal of such reformation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be to make it more like Switzerland for example,
where Cantons would make up the middle layer of government between municipalities
and state, protecting the rights of ethnic groups. While many Bosniak politicians would
likely accept this solution if it would mean the dissolution of Republika Srpska, Serb
politicians would never accept such a deal.217 Cantons might be a good solution, but it
would be very hard in practice to determine the borders and powers of these cantons. It is
very likely that some of them would be very underdeveloped, while the Sarajevo canton,
much like today’s in the Federation, would receive excess tax revenue in comparison
with other cantons. Also, cantonzation would not solve the problem of marginalization of
ethnic minorities in cantons where one ethnic group is the absolute majority (more than
2/3 of the population). Therefore, the Croat issue would not necessarily be completely
solved.
Croats are actually the most vocal group in support of this solution, because they
believe that the cantons would protect their rights in the territory in which they are the
majority, as well as giving Croats separate electoral units, in contrast to the present state
in which Croats share electoral units with four times more numerous Bosniaks. Actually,
depending on the number of cantons, it is possible that the new administration might be
as gigantic as the current administration, and then there is always the question of the
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power of cantons. If they have powers that entities enjoy today, then the administration is
likely to become even more expensive and simply unsustainable in most of the country. If
they have fewer powers, then Bosnia and Herzegovina would become more centralized, a
fear of many Croats and Serbs. Therefore, even though it seems like a good compromise
solution, cantonization of the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina is unlikely to happen,
and even less likely to become politically and economically sustainable. Serbs will veto
any reform that would take power from Republika Srpska, and would never allow its
dissolution, even in the face of the war. Moreover, the real problem in Bosnia and
Herzegovina is not Republika Srpska and its organizations, but rather the Federation in
which Croats and Bosniaks are often struggling for more power. Therefore, to solve the
Croat issue and ease tensions, we should look at ways to reform the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina rather than the whole state, because it is unlikely that the Serbs would
ever allow any changes to the organization of the territory under Republika Srpska.
Return to the original Washington Agreement
One relatively easy way to reform Bosnia and Herzegovina and solve the Croat
issue would be to simply revert back to the original Washington Agreement in the
Federation, or at least remove some of the more controversial amendments to the Federal
constitution created by the OHR. Still, this is impossible while the OHR is still active in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it is unlikely that the Bosniak parties would support
amendments to do such a thing. The good thing about this reform would be that Croats
could enjoy the protections and rights that they did in the 1990s after the war, without
touching the structure of the country mapped out in the Dayton Agreement. Moreover,
these reforms, together with the introduction of a separate Croat electoral unit for
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Presidency, would allow Croats to enjoy their political rights without further division of
the country and the redrawing of borders. It is very likely that Croats would accept this
solution, as well as the Serbs, who do not really care what is going on in the Federation,
as long as it does not influence Republika Srpska. Bosniak politicians would likely be
against such counter-reforms, but are more likely to accept this solution as a compromise
rather than the three republics or three entities solution.
The representatives of the “international community” in Bosnia and Herzegovina
headed by the OHR would never allow the removal of controversial amendments in order
to revert back to the more or less original Washington Agreement, because it would
portray the OHR’s involvement and reforms in the last two decades as one huge failure.
Moreover, this could potentially solve the Croat issue, but it is still a question if Croats
would be satisfied with only that after a decade of marginalization and losing their rights.
It is likely that they would want better guarantees than this, ideally in the form of third
entity. Moreover, this solution would not solve the problem of a gigantic administration
financed through foreign aid and massive loans that Bosnia and Herzegovina simply
cannot pay back.218 Therefore, the reformation of the electoral laws might be a good
immediate first step to protect Croat rights until a better reform can be agreed upon in the
near future. Still, just by itself, it is not a good solution and is likely to be little for
departing from the status quo, because Bosnia and Herzegovina in the present form is
unsustainable and will likely fail, and possibly dissolve if a viable solution is not
implemented relatively soon.
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The status quo and possible dissolution
The biggest danger facing Bosnia and Herzegovina is retaining the status quo and
not reforming at all. Reforms are necessary in order to protect the Croats and reverse the
increasingly centralistic tendencies of Bosniak parties in order to create a new Bosnia and
Herzegovina which will be loved by all three ethnic groups and national minorities. The
implementation of Sejdić-Finci ruling by the European Court of Human Rights that found
the Bosnian-Herzegovinian constitution and the method of running elections to the
Presidency were in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights. Bosnia and
Herzegovina must correct this in order to begin negotiations with the EU.219 Still, any
such reforms should also include administrative reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina to
make it financially more sustainable, as well as making sure that Croats have an equal
position with Serbs and Bosniaks. Therefore, until Bosnia and Herzegovina is reformed,
it is impossible for it to join the EU, and hence it is stuck in the status quo that had lasted
for almost two decades. Bosnia and Herzegovina today is plagued with poverty, ethnic
tension and extremism. The status quo is simply not sustainable for much longer. A
compromise must be found soon, otherwise the country faces the grim possibility of
dissolution and the renewal of violence. The German ambassador in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Christian Hellbach said that reforms are necessary, because Bosnia and
Herzegovina simply cannot finance administration and pensions any more by taking
foreign loans.220 Soon, it will run out of options, and when that happens, social unrests
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like the ones in 2014 can easily turn into ethnic violence. Such a road would lead Bosnia
and Herzegovina into chaos and dissolution.
The Serbs are fine with their position in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and while they
have separatist tendencies, there are unlikely to be realized unless the situation in the
Federation radicalizes. The burden of responsibility for the future of Bosnia and
Herzegovina is on Bosniak and Croat politicians in the Federation, and on their ability to
reach a compromise and to reform the Federation. If that does not happen soon, quite
ironically, pro-Bosnian politicians who swear to maintain integrity and uphold the unity
of Bosnia and Herzegovina might cause its dissolution. Even the International Crisis
Group predicted such a possibility in their last report on Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Theysaid that such a scenario might not be the worst, if Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot
reform in an independent country that treats all its three constituent peoples equally.221
Therefore, it might be time for Bosniak politicians to accept the reality that Bosnia and
Herzegovina is a multiethnic state with a troubled past and an unsustainable present
economic situation, and as such, the only hope of survival is if it is reformed into a
decentralized state that treats all three ethnic groups equally, no matter how politically
and emotionally painful these reforms might be for some Bosniaks who dream of a
unitary state. The status quo is simply unsustainable, and will likely be fatal for the future
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because without political reforms, Bosnia and Herzegovina
cannot enter the EU, nor reform its economy and take advantage of EU funds to curb its
record unemployment and poverty.
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Three republics
The very first “peace plan” offered to the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia
and Herzegovina was the so-called Lisbon Plan that offered three republics plan. It was
rejected by the Bosniaks in March 1992, only a few days before the full escalation of the
war. It would be somewhat ironic if Bosnia and Herzegovina would be reorganized into a
federal union of three republics more than two decades after this original proposal that
might have stopped the bloodshed. Such a proposal would likely leave Republika Srpska
as one republic, and create two republics from the territory of the Federation: one with a
Croat majority from Croat cantons and Croat municipalities in mixed cantons, and one
Bosniak with Bosniak municipalities and cantons. These new republics would have the
power of today’s entities, and maybe even some additional ones from the state level up in
order to make a Bosnia and Herzegovina more decentralized country. Serbs are very
likely to accept this proposal, and it would likely be a dream come true for Croats. Still,
Bosniaks are very much against this proposal, because some of them see Bosnia and
Herzegovina as an exclusive Bosniak homeland, and any further internal borders and
divisions based on ethnic lines are seen as an introduction to the final dissolution of
Bosnia and Herzegovina by separatist Croats and Serbs.222 Maybe, given all the dangers
of the status quo, Bosniaks would accept this deal in the near future, in exchange for less
power to these republics than entities have at the moment, which would then again be
vetoed by the Serbs. Simply, there is no good solution to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian
puzzle and the Croat issue that would satisfy all sides. It is likely that, if they want the
country to stay together and enter the EU eventually, Bosniaks will have to swallow a
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bitter pill and acknowledge the Croat right to their own entity or republic as Serbs have
today.
The upsides of the new republic system would be that each republic would have a
territory for each ethnic group, and the administration could be cut down in size. There
would be just two republics in the territory of the Federation, thus cutting down from ten
cantonal and one federal government to just two republic governments. Moreover, such
reorganization would solve the Croat issue and provide long lasting peace and the
rebuilding of trust between Croats and Bosniaks. It is likely that the economy would also
benefit, because now Croats would pay taxes to the Croat republic, and thus people
would be less likely to evade taxes than before when they were going to Sarajevo. Also,
other issues, such as the Croat TV channel could be solved in a new republic
governments, which would also eliminate the need for two houses of parliament. Finally,
another upside of this system would be the solution of the Sejdić-Finici issue and the
potential for Bosnia and Herzegovina to enter the EU eventually. Each of the three
republics could elect one member to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Presidency, and
members of the Presidency would not have to be ethnically Bosniak, Croat and Serb
respectively, but rather just elected in each one of these three proposed republics.
The downside of this proposal is that Bosniaks will likely not agree to it,
especially because of the idea of giving more powers to the republics than entities have
today. Also, there would be the question of protection of national minorities in these new
republics which would form new Confederal Bosnia and Herzegovina. There would have
to be laws and mechanisms in place that would guarantee the protection of Bosniaks,
Serbs, and Others in the Croat republic (and vice versa), but such mechanisms are
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possible to establish, as they already exist (although they are less than perfect) in
Republika Srpska. Another danger is the possible secessionist tendencies of Serb and
Croat republics and their wish to join Serbia and Croatia respectively at some later
point.223 I think that such issues are easily solvable by stating in the new constitution that
secession is only possible if all three republics agree that it is in everyone’s best interest,
thus reassuring Bosniaks that the Serbs and Croats will not secede and leave a small
Bosniak state surrounded by Croat and Serb republics. The real issue would be finding
exact borders of new republics.
While it would be easy for the Serb republic, which would have the borders of
Republika Srpska plus the Serb parts of District Brčko, it might be harder for the Croat
and Bosniak republics. Even though eight cantons have clear ethnic majorities (with the
exception of two Croat municipalities in one Bosniak canton and three Serb
municipalities in one Croat canton), the problem is in the two mixed cantons. Still, I
believe that municipality borders in these cantons can be easily changed so that few
multiethnic municipalities in Central Bosnia are “divided” into Croat and Bosniak
municipalities by the ethnic structure of different towns and villages, based on the 2013
census whose ethnic results will be published in June 2015. Moreover, because of the
territorial discontinuity of the three new republics, any secessionist tensions would be
hard to achieve, except maybe in Serb case because they would have a more or less
territorially continuous republic. The discontinuity of republics could reassure Bosniaks
that Croats will not try to secede. Still, I think that Bosniaks are not very likely to accept
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such a deal, and thus a three entities compromise would be more realistic and if reached it
could even unblock the negotiations of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the EU.
Three entities
Three entities, a slight modification of the three republic proposal, would be the
best solution in my opinion. Serbs would be fine with it, as long as it does not take away
any powers from their entity. Croats would finally feel like they are on an equal level
with Serbs and Bosniaks. Bosniaks do dislike the idea, but realistically it is the only
proposal that would allow all three ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be equal,
and therefore allowing Bosnia and Herzegovina to eventually join the EU. Because of
this Bosniaks should accept it if they want Bosnia and Herzegovina to finally escape the
political and economic black hole in which it was stuck for last two decades. It might
seem to some as accepting Croat war goals, but it is nothing more than what ethnic
groups have in other multiethnic European states such as Belgium and Switzerland. In
order to alleviate the fear of the Bosniak public, it might be a smart idea to call new
entities by medieval historic names of Bosnia’s and Herzegovina’s regions rather than the
much hated Herzeg-Bosnia name that Bosniak despise while many Croats still want to
use. Bosniaks are not likely to accept this deal, although they might, because the
alternative is further depressing economic trends and political isolation for Bosnia and
Herzegovina which might led to a Republika Srpska secession.224 It is not an easy choice,
but if they want to preserve the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is a choice that they
should make. Croats, who were stripped of many political rights in the last decade and a
half, will not start trusting Bosniaks again without such concessions.
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The upside of this proposal is that it solves not only the Croat issue, but also the
Sejdić-Finci issue, in the same way as explained above through the three republics
option. Because new entities will be territorially discontinued, Croats are not very likely
to have secessionist tendencies, because that would mean abandoning Croats in Central
Bosnia. Finally, administration could be cut down from 13 governments to only four
(state and three entities), saving a lot of money from very unsustainable cantons. This
proposal is likely to stimulate regional economic development and end the rule of OHR
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. State level governance of Bosnia and Herzegovina could stay
the same, and two new entities could have a very similar internal structure to Republika
Srpska. Because entities would not be given new (actually just old powers that were
amendment by OHR) powers, like separate army forces, it can be seen as a more
acceptable option for Bosniaks than the three republics option. Furthermore, Brčko would
still be a district, but now it can be jointly administrated by the Serb and Bosniak entities.
It would probably be a smart idea to create another district which would be jointly
administrated by Croats and Bosniaks, possibly in Jajce, in order to display the good faith
by both sides and ensure that Croats cannot secede because they would not leave Jajce
behind.
The downside of this proposal is that Bosniaks might see it as a separatist move,
and resist it. Still, it is the best possible option on the table in order to bring all three
groups to the same position. Another problem would be defining the borders between
Croat and Bosniak entities. Still, with the help of the 2013 census, this would not be an
impossible task. Municipal borders can be easily readjusted, as happened in the past,225 in
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order to make sure that most Bosniaks and most Croats end up in their new respective
entities. The Croatian Republican Party gave a solid proposal in 2014, which should be
modified to fit these new needs, but can act as a solid base. As I said, the Jajce district
could be a good way to connect these two new entities. The question of other ethnic
groups in these entities can be solved through guarantees of their rights and legal
mechanisms, in which entity with a Croat majority would look out for the well-being and
protection of Croats in the other two entities, and vice versa. Bosnia and Herzegovina
would still have three presidents, but now they would not have to be Bosniaks, Croats
and Serbs, but rather representatives from each of the three entities. In that case, if Croats
feel that Mr. Finci, who is Jewish by ethnicity, can best represent their interests at the
state level, despite not being ethnically Croat, they may choose him to represent them.
With this the road to the EU would be open after so many years of waiting.
Each entity could have its own TV station, solving that part of the Croat issue. For
the fear of secession, legal guarantees might be incorporated into the state constitution
which would prevent unilateral secession, as it was the case with nearby Kosovo. While
the three entities solution is not a perfect one, it is the most realistic solution to address
complicated relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its bloody history. With this
solution all three main ethnic groups would be put in the same position. It would also
allow national minorities to be elected, thus making Bosnia and Herzegovina a truly
democratic country. Once these political issues are solved and the OHR can leave Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the country and its ethnic groups could turn to economic development
and EU integration instead of fighting on political battlefields. All alternatives to the
three entities solution are less efficient and only the three entities solution could finally
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resolve the Croat issue and stop their marginalization and discrimination in their own
homeland. If the situation worsens, there is always the fear that the Croatian National
Assembly may declare another Home Rule, and this time there is not enough SFOR
troops and tanks to put it down, especially if Republika Srpska coordinates with the CNA
and declares secession at the same time. This would not be all that unlikely. In such a
situation, the dissolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina might become a sad reality.

Conclusion: A long road ahead
The Croat issue continuous to be one of the issues plaguing BosnianHerzegovinian political life, preventing it to function as a democratic country. Croat
political will was twice bypassed in establishing the Federal government in the last 15
years, as well as in two presidential elections. Croats do not have the political power to
protect their interests or even to have a TV channel in their own language, something that
a much smaller German community has in Belgium, for example. Bosnia and
Herzegovina, due to its complex nature, can only survive if it is reformed and all
constituent Peoples are given equal rights, like in other European multiethnic countries.
Any centralist tendencies by Bosniaks can only be, quite ironically bad, for the future of
Bosnia and Herzegovina which they love so much. It is worrying how poorly politicians
and policymakers in the West are informed about the Croat issue. It is my sincere hope
that this paper will help to illuminate the struggles and challenges that the Croats have
faced in the last 15 years. It is estimated that almost 50% of Croats since 1991 have
moved out of Bosnia and Herzegovina, some running for their lives, while others left in
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search of a better future that included political freedom and economic prosperity.226 If
Croats are to survive in their ancestral homeland, and if Bosnia and Herzegovina is ever
to enter the EU and develop, reforms of the political system must happen soon. Too much
time has already been lost in the past decades, and while other countries in the region
improved their standing, Bosnia and Herzegovina is still stuck in the mud of unequality
advocated by the Dayton Peace Agreement.
The best way to solve the Croat issue, as well as the Sejdić-Finci issue and the
problem of a gigantic and ineffective administration, is the three entities solution. Such a
solution, no matter how hard to negotiate and implement it may be, is the only one that
would guarantee equal rights for Bosniak, Croat and Serb communities in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, while protecting national minorities. Reforms can be painful and elevate
ethnic tensions, but in the long run, the three entities solution is the best way to secure a
peaceful and prosperous Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is likely that all three ethnic groups
would turn to themselves and economic development, instead of wasting energy on a
political battlefield in the Federation that often ends up with blockades and inefficient
governments. There is a long road ahead if Bosnia and Herzegovina is to become a truly
democratic and independent country. The status quo is unsustainable, and reforms are
much needed. Any centralist tendencies by Bosniaks might prove to be a bridge too far
for Bosnia and Herzegovina and, leading to dissolution. If Bosnia and Herzegovina is to
survive as a country and if Croats are to enjoy their rights again, only a decentralized
three entities state is a viable solution. It is my hope that this paper will help raise
awareness about this serious issue, and that Bosnian-Herzegovinian politicians will have
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enough political strength and maturity to go through with these much needed reforms
before the situation in the country grows worse.
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Appendix
All maps, unless stated otherwise, have been downloaded from Wikimedia Commons.

Map 1
Administrative division of Bosnia and Herzegovina
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Chart 1
Political structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Source: http://suffragio.org/2014/10/10/bosnia-set-for-elections-at-all-levels-of-government/
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Map 2
Ethnic map of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991
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Map 3
Ethnic map of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2005 (approximately)

Bosniaks - Green
Croats - Orange
Serbs - Blue
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Map 4
Map of the Croatian Home Rule in 2001
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Map 5
Map of candidates who won the most votes in each municipality in the presidential
elections of 2006
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Map 6
Map of candidates who won the most votes in each municipality in the presidential
elections of 2010

93

Bibliography
Ančić, Mladen. “Što ˝svi znaju˝ i što je ˝svima jasno˝glede rata u Bosni i Hercegovini.”
STATUS Magazin Za Političku Kulturu I Društvena Pitanja, no. 2 (May/June 2004): 6377.
“Apel: Pomozite Bosanskom Grahovu!” Hrvatski Informativni Centar. Accessed April 8,
2015. http://www.hic.hr/dom/346/dom03.htm.
Bečirović, Asaf. “Trusina 20 Godina Poslije: Kome Je Bio Potčinjen Zulfikar Ališpago?”
Oslobođenje, April 13, 2013. http://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/trusina-dvadesetgodina-poslije-kome-je-bio-potcinjen-zulfikar-alispago.
Bieber, Florian. Croat Self-Government in Bosnia - A Challenge for Dayton?. European
Centre for Minority Issues, May 2001. http://www.ecmi.de/publications/detail/croat-selfgovernment-in-bosnia-a-challenge-for-dayton-49/.
Bogut, Vlado. “Potpora Hrvatskom Narodnom Saboru BiH.” Slobodnadalmacija.hr, March
31, 2001. http://arhiv.slobodnadalmacija.hr/20010331/herceg-bosna.htm.
“Bosnia and Herzegovina Unemployment Rate.” Accessed April 8, 2015.
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/bosnia-and-herzegovina/unemployment-rate.
“Bosnia’s Alliance for (Smallish) Change.” International Crisis Group, August 2, 2002.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/132-bosniasalliance-for-smallish-change.aspx.
Bosnia’s Future. International Crisis Group (ICG), July 10, 2014.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/232bosnia-s-future.
“Čović: Federalizacija BiH, Pa Ulazak U EU.” Hrvatski Medijski Servis. Accessed April 8,
2015. http://hms.ba/covic-federalizacija-bih-pa-ulazak-u-eu/.
Craig Nation, R. War in the Balkans, 2003.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=123.
Dodig, Radoslav .“RTV pristojba – nepristojno državno džeparenje.” STATUS Magazin Za
Političku Kulturu i Društvena Pitanja, no. 9 (Spring 2006): 204-7.
Etnička Obilježja Stanovništva: Rezultati Za Republiku I Po Opštinama - 1991. Sarajevo:
ZAVOD ZA STATISTIKU REPUBLIKE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE, October 1993.
http://www.fzs.ba/Dem/Popis/Etnicka%20obiljezja%20stanovnistva%20bilten%20233.p
df.
“EU Treba Novi Pristup Prema Bosni I Hercegovini.” IDPI, January 29, 2014.
http://www.idpi.ba/eu-treba-novi-pristup-prema-bosni-i-hercegovini/.
Grbavac, Valentino. “Je Suis Šušnjar.” Dnevnik.ba, March 1, 2015.
http://dnevnik.ba/kolumna/je-suis-susnjar/9537.
———. “Prijetnje Budućnosti BiH I Posljednja Prilika Za Reforme.” Dnevnik.ba, February
10, 2015. http://dnevnik.ba/kolumna/prijetnje-buducnosti-bih-i-posljednja-prilika-zareforme/5849.
Hećimović, Esad. Garibi: mudžahedini u BiH 1992-1999. Zenica: Fondacija Sina, 2006.
“Historijat.” RTVFBIH. Accessed April 8, 2015.
http://www.rtvfbih.ba/loc/template.wbsp?wbf_id=21&section=info.
“Hrvata U BiH Ima Više Nego U Crkvenim Papirima.” Vijesti.ba, October 29, 2013.
http://www.vijesti.ba/kolumne-komentari/175177-Hrvata-BiH-ima-vise-nego-crkvenimpapirima.html.
94

“Hrvatska Republikanska Stranka - Prijedlog Ustavnih Promjena U BiH.” HRS, January 26,
2015. http://www.hrsbih.org/index.php/dokumenti/prijedlog-ustavnih-promjena-u-bih.
“Imenovana Nova Vlada Federacije BiH.” Www.vecernji.ba, March 31, 2015.
http://www.vecernji.ba/imenovana-nova-vlada-federacije-bih-998026.
“Inzkova odluka o suspendiranju odluka CIK-a o konstituiranju Vlasti u FBiH.” Radio
Slobodna Evropa, March 28, 2011.
http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/backgrounderfullpage/3539560.html.
“Izborni Legitimitet Martina Raguža Kao Kandidata Za Hrvatskog Člana Predsjedništva BiH.”
IDPI, November 4, 2014. http://www.idpi.ba/martin-raguz/.
“IZGORIO ARHIV BiH ‘Spalili Su Dokumente Koji Su Preživjeli Tri Rata. Ovo Je Kulturna
Sramota!.’” Jutarnji.hr, February 8, 2014. http://www.jutarnji.hr/izgorio-arhiv-bih--ovoje-kulturna-sramota--zapalili-su-dokumete-koji-su-prezivjeli-tri-rata-/1163045/.
“Kako Je Uništena Hercegovačka Banka?” Hrvatski Medijski Servis. Accessed April 8, 2015.
http://hms.ba/cetrnaesta-obljetnica-brutalnog-upada-u-hercegovacku-banku/.
Karačić, Marko. “Podržat Ćemo Hrvate, Trebaju Imati Svoj Entitet.” Www.vecernji.ba,
August 1, 2014. http://www.vecernji.ba/podrzat-cemo-hrvate-trebaju-imati-svoj-entitet953536.
Kasapović, Mirjana. “Bosna I Hercegovina: Deset Godina Nakon Daytona.” STATUS Magazin
Za Političku Kulturu i Društvena Pitanja, no. 9 (Spring 2006): 44–74.
Krešić, Zoran. “Iz Goražda Se Bira Jedan Hrvat, Kao I Iz Posavine Gdje Ih Je 588 Puta Više.”
Www.vecernji.ba, September 23, 2014. http://www.vecernji.ba/iz-gorazda-se-bira-jedanhrvat-kao-i-iz-posavine-gdje-ih-je-588-puta-vise-962662.
———. “Prije Godinu Dana Srušen Je Daytonski Sporazum U FBiH.” Www.vecernji.ba,
March 16, 2012. http://www.vecernji.ba/prije-godinu-dana-srusen-je-daytonskisporazum-u-fbih-387787.
———. “Uništenje Hercegovačke Banke Bilo Je Projekt Slamanja Hrvata.” Www.vecernji.ba,
April 7, 2011. http://www.vecernji.ba/unistenje-hercegovacke-banke-bilo-je-projektslamanja-hrvata-273859.
Krišto, B., and M. Sivrić. “Mostarce Zamijenila Federalna TV,” February 19, 2000.
http://arhiv.slobodnadalmacija.hr/20000219/novosti3.htm.
Lippman, Peter. “Washington Report on Middle East Affairs - Bosnia’s ‘Historic’ Elections:
The Usual Tensions, Plus a Seed of Hope.” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs.
Accessed April 8, 2015. http://www.wrmea.org/2006-december/bosniashistoric%C2%9D-elections-the-usual-tensions-plus-a-seed-of-hope.html.
Lisjak, Tatjana. “Hrvatima Ne Damo Poseban Entitet, Izbornu Jedinicu I Televizijski Kanal.”
Www.vecernji.hr, November 14, 2014. http://www.vecernji.hr/svijet/hrvatima-ne-damoposeban-entitet-izbornu-jedinicu-i-televizijski-kanal-973549.
Lučić, Ivo. “Što je (bila) Bosna i Hercegovina i tko smo (bili) mi.” STATUS Magazin Za
Političku Kulturu i Društvena Pitanja, no. 14 (Spring 2010): 107-136.
———. Uzroci Rata: Bosna I Hercegovina Od 1980. Do 1992. Godine. Zagreb: Despot
Infinitus, 2013.
Mrduljaš, Saša. “HRVATSKA POLITIKA UNUTAR BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE U
KONTEKSTU DEKLARATIVNOGA I REALNOGA PROSTORNOG OPSEGA
HRVATSKE ZAJEDNICE / REPUBLIKE HERCEG-BOSNE (1991.–1994.).”
Društvena istraživanja 18, no. 4–5 (102–103) (October 30, 2009): 825–50.

95

Mujkić, Asim. “Treći entitet (II) ˝Bauk˝ liberalne demokratije kruži Bosnom.” STATUS
Magazin Za Političku Kulturu i Društvena Pitanja, no. 12 (Winter 2007): 154-162.
Nacionalni Sastav Stanovništva: Rezultati Za Republiku Po Opštinama I Naseljenim Mjestima
- 1991. Sarajevo: ZAVOD ZA STATISTIKU REPUBLIKE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE,
December 1993.
http://www.fzs.ba/Dem/Popis/nacionalni%20sastav%20stanovnistva%20po%20naseljeni
m%20mjestima%20bilten%20234.pdf.
Nardelli, Alberto, Denis Dzidic, and Elvira Jukic. “Bosnia and Herzegovina: The World’s
Most Complicated System of Government?” The Guardian, October 8, 2014.
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/oct/08/bosnia-herzegovina-electionsthe-worlds-most-complicated-system-of-government.
“Neizvjesna Budućnost BiH: Tri Naroda - Tri Vizije.” Index.hr, March 29, 2010.
http://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/neizvjesna-buducnost-bih-tri-naroda--trivizije/483373.aspx.
“Njemački Ambasador Kristijan Helbah: Koliko Dugo Možete Živjeti Na Kredit!?” Avaz.ba,
March 19, 2015. http://www.avaz.ba/clanak/169353/njemacki-ambasador-kristijanhelbah-koliko-dugo-mozete-zivjeti-na-kredit.
“Obilježena 23. Obljetnica Utemeljenja Herceg-Bosne I Dan Županije
Zapadnohercegovačke.” Bljesak.info, November 18, 2014.
http://www.bljesak.info/rubrika/vijesti/clanak/obiljezena-23-obljetnica-utemeljenjahercegbosne-i-dan-zupanije-zapadnohercegovacke/101322.
“Od Referenduma Do Naših Dana.” Oslobođenje, February 28, 2013.
http://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/od-referenduma-do-nasih-dana.
“OHR General Information.” Accessed April 8, 2015. http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/.
“Operation Deliberate Force.” Global Security. Accessed April 8, 2015.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/deliberate_force.htm.
“OTKRIVAMO Sarajevo Dobilo 1,2 Milijarde KM Prihoda Drugih Kantona!”
Http://www.avaz.ba, January 14, 2015. http://www.avaz.ba/clanak/157964/otkrivamosarajevo-dobilo-1-2-milijarde-km-prihoda-drugih-kantona.
Pavić, Snježana. “PREDSJEDNIK HDZ-A BIH Dragan Čović: ‘Prijeti Nam Da Broj Hrvata U
BiH Padne Ispod 10%.’” Jutarnji.hr, September 28, 2013. http://www.jutarnji.hr/dragancovic---prijeti-nam-da-broj-hrvata-u-bih-padne-ispod-10--/1129049/.
“PETRITSCH SMIJENIO ANTU JELAVIĆA.” HRT. Accessed April 8, 2015.
http://www.hrt.hr/arhiv/2001/03/07/HRT0050.html.
Popović, Ana. “Egzodus Hrvata Srednje Bosne.” Www.vecernji.ba, April 10, 2011.
http://www.vecernji.ba/egzodus-hrvata-srednje-bosne-274876.
———. “Skandal Na Sjednici: Pobili Smo Vas ’93., Pobit Ćemo Vas Opet!” Večernji.hr, May
31, 2014. http://www.vecernji.hr/svijet/pobili-smo-vas-93-pobit-cemo-vas-opet-942115.
“Poražavajuće: 68.000 Građana Napustilo BiH, U Migraciji Blizu 100.000 Ljudi!” 6yka.com,
March 9, 2015. http://www.6yka.com/novost/76487/porazavajuce-68.000-gradananapustilo-bih-u-migraciji-blizu-100.000-ljudi-.
“Porazna Bilanca ‘Platforme’, Njezini Povijesni Prethodnici I Mogući Rizici Negativnog
Kontinuiteta.” IDPI, February 12, 2014. http://www.idpi.ba/porazna-bilanca-platformenjezini-povijesni-prethodnici-i-moguci-rizici-negativnog-kontinuiteta/.

96

“PREDSJEDNISTVO BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE 2006.” Izbori.ba. Accessed April 8, 2015.
https://www.izbori.ba/rezultati/konacni/predsjednistvo_bih/Predsjednistvo.asp?nivo=702
&nivo1=701.
“PREDSJEDNISTVO BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE 2010.” Izbori.ba. Accessed April 8, 2015.
http://izbori.ba/Finalni2010/Finalni/PredsjednistvoBiH/Default.aspx.
“PREDSJEDNISTVO BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE 2014.” Izbori.ba. Accessed April 8, 2015.
http://izbori.ba/Potvrdjeni2014/Finalni/PredsjednistvoBiH/Default.aspx.
“Preko 140.000 Potpisa Protiv ‘Majorizacije Hrvata.’” RadioSarajevo.ba, March 3, 2011.
http://www.radiosarajevo.ba/novost/46215.
“Prosvjedi U Federaciji BiH: Građanski, Socijalni Ili Nešto Treće?” IDPI, February 12, 2014.
http://www.idpi.ba/prosvjedi-u-federaciji-bih-gradanski-socijalni-ili-nesto-trece/.
“Raspodjela Neizravnih Poreza U Federaciji BiH Odnosno Kako Je Sarajevo Dobilo 1,2
Milijarde KM Prihoda Drugih Županija.” IDPI, July 15, 2014.
http://www.idpi.ba/raspodjela-neizravnih-poreza-u-federaciji-bih-odnosno-kako-jesarajevo-dobilo-12-milijarde-km-prihoda-drugih-zupanija/.
“Return of Bosnian Serb Displaced Persons to Drvar, Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoc.”
Refworld. Accessed April 8, 2015. http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6d018.html.
“Rezolucija Europskog Parlamenta.” IDPI, February 11, 2014. http://www.idpi.ba/rezolucijaeuropskog-parlamenta/.
“Rezultati Izbora 2000 Federacija.” Izbori.ba. Accessed April 8, 2015.
https://www.izbori.ba/Documents/Documents/Rezultati%20izbora%20962002/2000gen/fbihhor-eng.pdf.
“Rezultati Izbora 2002 Predsjedništvo.” Izbori.ba. Accessed April 8, 2015.
https://izbori.ba/Documents/Documents/Rezultati%20izbora%20962002/Rezultati2002/Puni/PredsjednistvoBiH.pdf.
“Rezultati Izbora U Bosni I Hercegovini Od 14. Rujna 1996.” Izbori.ba. Accessed April 8,
2015. https://www.izbori.ba/Documents/Documents/Rezultati%20izbora%20962002/96results/FD96_20H.PDF.
“Rezultati Popisa O Vjerskim, Etničkim I Jezičnim Obilježjima Do 15. Lipnja.” Dnevnilist.ba. Accessed April 8, 2015. http://dnevni-list.ba/web1/rezultati-popisa-o-vjerskimetnickim-i-jezicnim-obiljezjima-do-15-lipnja/.
Rudolf, Davorin. “Hrvatska i Hrvati u Bosni i Hercegovini.” Adrias, no. 17 (October 12,
2011): 221–34.
Rupčić, Valentina. “HDZ BiH Najjača Stranka S Ukupno 13 Mandata.” Www.vecernji.ba,
January 14, 2015. http://www.vecernji.ba/hdz-bih-najjaca-stranka-s-ukupno-13-mandata984017.
———. “Koalicija HNS-a: HDZ BiH, HSS, HKDU, HSP Dr. A. S., HSP HB.”
Www.vecernji.ba, June 24, 2014. http://www.vecernji.ba/koalicija-hns-a-hdz-bih-hsshkdu-hsp-dr-a-s-hsp-hb-946538.
Sarajlić, Eldar. Kultura Kulture: Etnicitet, Postmodernost I Politika. Mostar: Dijalog Mostar,
2010. http://www.superknjizara.hr/?page=knjiga&id_knjiga=46267.
Shrader, Charles R. The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History, 19921994. 1 edition. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003.
Sivrić, Marijan. “Hrvatske Zastupnike Biraju Bošnjaci I Srbi!” Slobodnadalmacija.hr, October
14, 2000. http://arhiv.slobodnadalmacija.hr/20001014/novosti1.htm.

97

Skoko, Božo. Imidž Bosne I Hercegovine Iz Perspektive Njezinih Građana I Međusobna
Percepcija Bošnjaka, Hrvata I Srba. Sarajevo: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2013.
Šoljić, Vladimir, interviewed by Valentino Grbavac, August 22, 2014.
Tadić, Mato. Ustavnopravni Položaj Hrvata U Bosni I Hercegovini Od Vašingtonskog
Sporazuma Do Danas. Mostar: Matica Hrvatska Mostar, 2013.
“The Conflicts.” Accessed April 8, 2015. http://www.icty.org/sid/322.
“The Sejdic-Finci Question.” The Economist. Accessed April 9, 2015.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/10/bosnia.
“The World Factbook: Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed April
8, 2015. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html.
Trukhachev, Vadim. “Bosnia Can Be Exploded by Croatian ‘Bomb.’” English Pravda.ru,
April 21, 2011. http://english.pravda.ru/world/europe/21-04-2011/117648bosnia_herzegovina_croatia-0/.
Tuđman, Miroslav. Bosna I Hercegovina U Raljama Zapadne Demokracije. Zagreb: Despot
Infinitus, 2013.
Tulić, Zlatko. “Hrvati U Ratu U BiH Mučeni U 331 Logoru, a Za 20 Godina Sudilo Se Za
Slučajeve Iz Dva.” Www.vecernji.ba, May 31, 2014. http://www.vecernji.ba/hrvati-uratu-u-bih-muceni-u-331-logoru-a-za-20-godina-sudilo-se-za-slucajeve-iz-dva-942060.
“U Mostaru Poručuju: 5 Nije Trećina Od 17.” Nezavisne Novine, November 25, 2013.
http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/drustvo/U-Mostaru-porucuju-5-nije-trecina-od-17219602.html.
Vasilj, Miroslav. “Modeli ustroja javnih RTV servisa u pluralnim državama.” STATUS
Magazin Za Političku Kulturu i Društvena Pitanja, no. 16 (Summer 2013): 126-132.
Vukoja, Ivan. “Bošnjačko odustajanje od nacionalizma na SDP-ov način nasuprot deklaraciji
ZAVNOBIH-a i preambuli Ustava.” STATUS Magazin Za Političku Kulturu i Društvena
Pitanja, no. 15 (Spring 2011): 83-98.
———. “Izbori Kao Sredstvo Diskriminacije Hrvata U BiH.” IDPI, October 9, 2014.
http://www.idpi.ba/izbori-kao-sredstvo-diskriminacije-hrvata/.
———. “Liberalni etnonacionalizam i multikulturalno građanstvo nasuprot liberalnom
fundamentalizmu i mitu o etnokulturnoj neutralnosti.” STATUS Magazin Za Političku
Kulturu i Društvena Pitanja, no. 14 (Spring 2010): 30-48.
———. “Primjeri ne-konstitutivnosti i ne-jednakopravnosti Hrvata u Federaciji BiH.”
STATUS Magazin Za Političku Kulturu i Društvena Pitanja, no. 16 (Summer 2013): 92106.
———. “Treći entitet – uvod u podjelu ili stabilizaciju države.” STATUS Magazin Za
Političku Kulturu i Društvena Pitanja, no. 12 (Winter 2007): 144-153.
Woehrel, Steven. Bosnia and Herzegovina: Current Issues and U.S. Policy. Congressional
Research Service, January 24, 2013. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40479.pdf.
“ZASTUPNICKI/PREDSTAVNICKI DOM PARLAMENTA FEDERACIJE BOSNE I
HERCEGOVINE 2010.” Izbori.ba. Accessed April 8, 2015.
https://www.izbori.ba/Finalni2010/Finalni/ParlamentFBIH/ZbirniRezultate.aspx.
“ZASTUPNICKI/PREDSTAVNICKI DOM PARLAMENTA FEDERACIJE BOSNE I
HERCEGOVINE 2014.” Izbori.ba. Accessed April 8, 2015.
https://www.izbori.ba/Potvrdjeni2014/Finalni/ParlamentFBIH/ZbirniRezultate.aspx.
Zelenika, Pero. “Hrvata Manje 27,3, Srba 9,3, Bošnjaka 3,5 Posto.” Www.vecernji.ba, January
11, 2014. http://www.vecernji.ba/hrvata-manje-273-srba-93-bosnjaka-35-posto-914537.
98

Žepić, Božo. “Prijedlozi i planovi međunarodne zajednice za Bosnu i Hercegovinu.” National
security and the future 6, no. 3–4. (September 1, 2005): 9–36.

99

